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Through the years at the market Länsförsäkringar has built up an organization with a strong 
brand, great economy and a good customer base, which create a great starting point to build 
up a franchise chain from. Today there are also two well-developed and successful franchise 
organizations within insurance and real estate agency. On this basis, there is possibility for 
Länsförsäkringar to consider if an advantageous future development could be to develop the 
franchise concept. 
  
Since each regional company within Länsförsäkringar has its own operations, the arrangement 
of the performance of the services that Länsförsäkringar offers is designed differently in 
different regional companies. Home inspection is an example of a service performed in 
various ways in different regional companies. Some regional companies choose to outsource 
all home inspections, while others choose to perform all home inspections in-house. 
Länsförsäkringar Stockholm is an example of a regional company that has selected a 
combination of these two performances.  
 
Home inspections can largely be seen as a service that is closely linked to one of 
Länsförsäkringar's core businesses - insurance. When Länsförsäkringar should insure a house 
it wants to conduct a home inspection to be aware of the object's current state. This 
information creates a basis for to which degree Länsförsäkringar chooses to insure the house. 
At the same time damage prevention can be done since the home owner becomes aware of the 
object's shortcomings and risks. When the home inspection within Länsförsäkringar 
Stockholm is outsourced, it is difficult to fully take advantage of all the information and the 
exchange that the inspection could give. Through a performance of the home inspection under 
a franchise concept, it is also possible for Länsförsäkringar to take the opportunity to create 
customer relationships and build brand.  
 
The aim of this study is to provide theoretical explanations for Länsförsäkringar Stockholm’s 
opportunities to expand the franchise concept by including home inspections. In particular, 
the study examines whether the current franchisees are interested in broadening the franchise 
concept with additional services. The theoretical starting point for the study is the Transaction 
Cost Theory and the Agency Theory, which form the basis for the formulation of a number of 
hypotheses which become tested empirically. Through a web-based questionnaire, which is 
sent out to the 103 franchisees within insurance, quantitative data is collected. 
 
The result of the study shows that there is a demand among today's franchisees to expand the 
current range with additional services. For those franchisees home inspection is considered to 
be the most attractive service. The franchisees do not perceive any significant uncertainty 
about the future. However, they perceive that an expanded franchise concept would be very 
positive if it contributes to a creation of interdependence between the parties for a future 
cooperation. Whether an expanded franchise concept would lead to a creation of 
interdependence between the parties is, however, linked to what type of service that the 
franchise concept would be expanded with. If it becomes expanded with home inspection the 
franchisees would have to do extensive transaction-specific investments. Within 
Länsförsäkringar Stockholm, and several other regional companies, a large part of the 
knowledge of home inspection already exists, which gives Länsförsäkringar a superior 
position of control. This study shows that a combination between franchise autonomy and 
relational forms of governance would be preferable for Länsförsäkringar to create the greatest 
possible growth in the long term for Länsförsäkringar and the entire franchise chain.  






Länsförsäkringar har under åren på marknaden byggt upp en organisation med ett starkt 
varumärke, god ekonomi och en bred kundbas, vilket skapar ett bra utgångsläge för att bygga 
en franchiseverksamhet. I dag finns det också två väl utvecklade och framgångsrika 
franchiseorganisationer inom försäkrings- och fastighetsförmedling. Utifrån denna grund 
finns det möjlighet för Länsförsäkringar att överväga om en framtida gynnsam 
utvecklingsmöjlighet skulle kunna vara att utveckla franchisekonceptet. 
 
Eftersom varje länsbolag inom Länsförsäkringar har sin egen verksamhet är utförandet av de 
produkter och tjänster som Länsförsäkringar erbjuder utformat på skiljda sätt inom olika 
länsbolag. Nyteckningsbesiktning är exempel på en tjänst som utförs på olika sätt i olika 
länsbolag då en del länsbolag väljer att outsourca hela besiktningsverksamheten, medan andra 
väljer att utföra all besiktning i egen regi. Länsförsäkringar Stockholm är ett exempel på ett 
länsbolag som har valt en kombination av dessa två utföranden. 
  
Nyteckningsbesiktning kan i hög grad ses som en tjänst som är nära förknippad med en av 
Länsförsäkringars kärnverksamheter – försäkring. När Länsförsäkringar ska försäkra ett hus 
genomförs besiktningar för att bli medveten om objektets nuvarande skick. Denna 
information skapar grund för hur Länsförsäkringar väljer att försäkra huset samtidigt som ett 
skadeförebyggande arbete kan utföras genom att husägaren blir medveten om objektets brister 
och risker. När nyteckningsbesiktningen inom Länsförsäkringar Stockholm outsourcas är det 
dock svårt att fullt ut dra nytta av all den information och det utbyte som besiktningen skulle 
kunna ge. Genom ett utförande av nyteckningsbesiktning i en franchiseverksamhet är det 
dessutom möjligt för Länsförsäkringar att ta tillfället i akt för att skapa kundrelationer och 
bygga varumärke.  
  
Syftet för denna studie är att ge teoretiska förklaringar till Länsförsäkringar Stockholms 
möjligheter att utöka franchisekonceptet genom att inkludera nyteckningsbesiktning. I 
synnerhet studeras huruvida de nuvarande franchisetagarna inom försäkring är intresserade av 
att bredda konceptet med ytterligare tjänster. Den teoretiska utgångspunkten för studien är 
Transaktionskostnadsteorin och Agentteorin, vilka ligger till grund för utformandet av ett 
antal hypoteser som testas empiriskt. Genom ett webbaserat frågeformulär, som skickas ut till 
de 103 franchisetagarna, insamlas kvantitativ data.  
 
Resultatet för studien visar på att det finns en efterfrågan hos dagens franchisetagare att utöka 
det nuvarande utbudet med ytterligare en tjänst. För dessa franchisetagare anses just 
nyteckningsbesiktning vara den mest attraktiva tjänsten. Franchisetagarna känner inte någon 
betydande osäkerhet inför framtiden. Dock upplever de att ett utökat franchisekoncept skulle 
vara väldigt positivt om det bidrog till att det skapades ett ömsesidigt beroende till ett 
framtida samarbete mellan parterna. Huruvida ett utökat franchisekoncept skulle leda till att 
det skapas ett ömsesidigt beroende mellan parterna är dock kopplat till vilken typ av tjänst 
som franchisekonceptet utökas med. Om franchisekonceptet utökades med 
besiktningsverksamhet skulle det leda till att franchisetagarna fick göra omfattande 
transaktionsspecifika investeringar, medan en stor del av kunskapen kring besiktning redan 
finns inom Länsförsäkringar Stockholm, och flera andra länsbolag, vilket skulle ge 
Länsförsäkringar ett överläge. Denna studie visar på att en kombination mellan 
självständighet hos franchisetagaren och relationsanpassad styrning (relational forms of 
governance) skulle vara att föredra för Länsförsäkringar för att skapa största möjliga tillväxt 
för Länsförsäkringar och franchisekedjan på lång sikt.      
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1.1 Problem background 
 
In a value chain a product or service is created to satisfy the end customers’ demand 
(Coughlan et al., 2006). How the value chain is organized and coordinated to meet this 
demand can look differently. One of the decisions is to structure who that will perform what 
in the value chain. On the market it is a general trend that companies must achieve both 
higher productivity and efficiency (Greaver, 1999). Therefore companies must accomplish 
more with fewer resources. To meet this situation, companies focus their limited resources on 
those activities that are most essential and work thus toward specialization. Thereby it has 
been an extensive increase of strategies for outsourcing, which is when an organization 
entrusts another firm to perform activities that would otherwise be performed within the 
organization itself. 
 
Until the late 1980s, companies’ operations for an extended period had been characterized by 
focus on volume and economies of scale, and thus the focus was on production capacity 
(Greaver, 1999). At this time, companies instead began to increasingly focus on knowledge 
and value creation. More and more companies achieved increased capacity by outsourcing, 
and thereby replacing the lack of internal capacity that existed in some parts of the operations 
with an external knowledge. Since the 1990s, the reason to why companies choose to 
outsource has shifted from focusing on production process to instead focus on the service that 
is linked to the product. Today the strategy to outsource certain functions is regarded as an 
ability to focus on the core business, and thereby increase the flexibility (Fan, 2000). Other 
common reasons for companies to choose to outsource a function are an expectation of lower 
costs and economies of scale, associated with higher quality of service (Abrahamsson et al., 
2003). 
  
When outsourcing is used in the best way, it can lead to major positive effects, but if 
outsourcing is seen as the only solution there are risks that the company fail to improve their 
performance (Abrahamsson et al., 2003). For example, a performance of activities in-house 
sometimes increases the coordination of the different functions, compared to when activities 
are outsourced (Coughlan et al., 2006). Another option to outsource an activity is cooperation 
with a deeper degree of integration. A deeper integration creates a higher dependence between 
the parties and thereby they achieve a greater coordination. An example of integration is when 
two companies form a strategic alliance and thus strive towards a common goal. A strategic 
alliance is characterized by that more trust can be created between the parties thanks to the 
shared goal.  
 
One type of strategic alliance is franchising, which is a form of cooperation between parties 
that, in terms of ownership, are independent to each other (Coughlan et al., 2006). The 
franchisor owns a business concept that other can rent for its own business. Franchising gives 
the franchisor the opportunity to expand its business and mission, without an increase in 
capital and a risk-sharing (Ideström and Fernlund, 2009). The franchisee can, through this 
partnership, take part of an already tested and profitable business idea, while the franchisor 
gets access to economies of scale and become part of a network of other operators who do 
exactly the same thing. The franchisee gets part of an accumulated structural capital, in form 
of procedures, methods and systems, which facilitates the work (Persson, 2000). This 
increases the predictability in the franchisee’s business, which reduces the franchisor’s risks 




significantly. However, the cooperation through franchising entails risks for both parties since 
the integration is based on that both parties need to trust each other to a great extent. These 
risks can be reduced if both parties perceive that there is a higher degree of interdependence. 
When cooperation works well the organization through franchise provides opportunities for 
the parties to share the workload in a rational and efficient way.   
 
Today it is 700 franchisors in Sweden with combined sales of approximately 215 billion SEK 
(Internet, Swedish franchise, 1, 2015). The franchise operations account for near six percent 
of Sweden’s GDP. Actually Sweden is, seen by the number of inhabitants, one of the 
countries with most franchise operations in Europe (Ideström and Fernlund, 2009). In the US, 
however, the market share of franchising is the double against Sweden. Since 2002, the 
number of franchises in Sweden has increased by 222 percent to today comprise about 30 
thousand companies, which employs 110 000 people (www, Svensk Franchise, 1, 2015). Just 
in the last five years the trend has been that the number of franchisees has increased by 18 
percent and this trend expects to continue. Today, franchising is a business form that is 
suitable for many industries, but traditionally the largest proportion of franchised businesses 
existed in the retail. Even today, however, 30 percent of the franchise companies operate in 
this industry. The bankruptcy rate in the retail was 1.5 percent in 2012, and the share of 
bankruptcy in the Swedish franchise was 0.8 percent. This comparison shows that franchise 
businesses have a much lower frequency bankruptcy. 
 
Länsförsäkringar is one of the organizations in Sweden that has a franchise organization. 
Today Länsförsäkringar performs franchise operations within both life- and property 
insurance and real estate agency (pers.comm. Johansson). The franchise operation within life- 
and property insurance started in 1998 when Länsförsäkringar acquired Wasa in 1998, which 
since 1984 had a franchise organization. Länsförsäkringar increased the number of services in 
2006 when the real estate agency became a new business that only is performed under a 
franchise concept.  
 
Besides insurance and real estate agency Länsförsäkringar also has operations within banking 
(Internet, Länsförsäkringar, 1, 2015). Insurance is, however, Länsförsäkringar’s most 
extensive operation which, besides the franchise organization, also is performed through 
Länsförsäkringar’s own employees. Through the years at the market Länsförsäkringar has 
built up a strong brand, good economy and a solid customer base (pers.comm. Johansson). 
These grounds have formed the potential for a franchise concept, which has been created in 
the organization. Within insurance Länsförsäkringar today has franchise operations in twelve 
of the 23 regional companies that Länsförsäkringar consists of. The franchise operation within 
insurance has 137 franchisees that have access to Länsförsäkringar’s developed business 
concept. To manage and coordinate the franchise operation within insurance a Council and a 
Committee of franchise is established. 
 
In 2008 the Swedish Franchise Association appointed Länsförsäkringar to the year's franchise 
system (Internet, Svensk Franchise, 2, 2015). In the grounds mentioned that Länsförsäkringar 
is a very fine ambassador for Swedish franchise systems and that the concept has yielded 
success for a long time with a very good profitability in the franchisee and franchisor stages, a 








1.2 Problem  
 
Today Länsförsäkringar has built up an organization around franchising that is strong. It is 
base to consider that Länsförsäkringar has opportunities to take synergies from this 
organization and thereby expand the franchise concept by including more products and 
services. Länsförsäkringar offers services in insurance, banking and real estate agency today. 
The entire real estate agency is conducted under a franchise concept, while the sales of 
insurance partly are conducted by Länsförsäkringar's own employees and through a franchise 
organization. 
 
Among Länsförsäkringar’s operations Länsförsäkringar’s most extensive segment is 
insurance (Länsförsäkringar, 1, 2015). Especially, Länsförsäkringar is dominating on the 
market of property insurance, where Länsförsäkringar has a market share of 30 percent 
(Internet, Svensk försäkring, 2015). Thus, insurance can be regarded as one of 
Länsförsäkringar's core businesses. A service that is closely connected to the insurance 
business is home insurance inspections (home inspections) (pers.comm. Öhman). Through the 
home inspection the insurance company investigates the condition of the house that is going 
to be insured. Further, the insurer becomes aware of the risks that the house is associated with 
and whether the house already has been afflicted with shortcomings. This risk situation forms 
the base for whether the insurance company chooses to Full Value Insure the object or not, 
which determines whether the insurer has full responsibility for payment of any damages.  
 
A well-executed home inspection results in damage prevention, because the owner of the 
house becomes aware of the house's potential gaps and gets appropriate action proposals 
(pers.comm. Öhman). The damage prevention helps thereby to limit the risk of future damage 
such as fire- and water injury. In next step the damage prevention can reduce the cases of 
damage that Länsförsäkringar must manage and regulate.  
 
Unlike parts of the insurance business within Länsförsäkringar, the home inspection is not 
performed by a franchise organization (pers.comm. Johansson). It is different between the 
regional companies within Länsförsäkringar how they choose to perform the home inspection, 
since some have the strategy to outsource the execution while others perform it in-house. 
Further it is also different to which degree the regional companies choose to perform damage 
prevention. Länsförsäkringar Stockholm is one of the regional companies who perform the 
home inspections through a combination of executions (pers.comm. Öhman). The risk 
Länsförsäkringar Stockholm evaluates a house is associated with determines who perform the 
home inspection. Today this has lead to that around 90-95 percent of the houses within 
Länsförsäkringar Stockholm is inspected by an external supplier.  
 
The home inspection can also be seen as an opportunity to have a physical meet with the 
customer. In this meeting Länsförsäkringar Stockholm could get to know the customer better 
and strengthen the relationship which is difficult to develop to a greater extent for companies 
within insurance and banking. In this customer meeting Länsförsäkringar Stockholm’s brand 
can be strengthened, due to that Länsförsäkringar Stockholm shows a commitment to the 
customer’s safety and its house value, which is both in the customer’s and the insurer's 
interests.  
 
Increased damage prevention could benefit the entire activity of Länsförsäkringar’s property 
insurance and at the same time give an opportunity to additional sales. Furthermore increased 
damage prevention results in that houses in a greater extent could be measured by the risk 




they hold, which from the collective perspective gives better proportioned insurances.  A 
strategy with expanded damage prevention can result in that the customer can obtain different 
values than the lowest price, and thereby Länsförsäkringar can stand out in the market that 
otherwise is dominated by an intense price pressure (Internet, Länsförsäkringar 2, 2015). 
 
Since home inspection can be considered as an activity that is closely linked to one of 
Länsförsäkringar's core businesses – insurance - there are grounds to investigate whether it 
would be preferable to perform a greater proportion of this services in-house than today. If it 
had been preferable to execute more home inspections in-house, an alternative to execute the 
examinations by Länsförsäkringar’s own employees is to develop the already existing and 
successful franchise organization. In such cases an alternative is that the existing franchisees 
within insurance expand their range of products and services to also include home 
inspections. 
 
1.3 Problem analysis – clarifications and delimitation 
 
The reasoning in the previous section shows a strategic position that all organizations and 
value chains face, namely who should do what, in the creation of customer value. More and 
more organizations have chosen to outsource the activities that are not the organization's most 
essential. Länsförsäkringar Stockholm chooses, from the situation that is today, to outsource 
the most of the executions of home inspection to a third party. There is however room to 
study whether the home inspection can be considered as closely connected with 
Länsförsäkringar's core business - insurance – and thus if it is preferable to perform this 
activity in-house. Strategy decisions regarding sourcing is, however, highly specific for each 
case. Thus, the study of the conditions that exist around this value chain cannot lead to 
general conclusions can be drawn about the general factors affecting the choice of execution. 
  
Home inspection 
Potentially there are many options of services that the franchise concept could be extended 
with. This study, however, has no room to give a picture of which opportunities 
Länsförsäkringar Stockholm has to expand the franchise concept with other products and 
services than home inspections. 
 
Länsförsäkringar 
Many of the conditions, about how Länsförsäkringar Stockholm and its value chain should be 
designed, are the same for the other regional companies within Länsförsäkringar. For 
example, regional companies have similar needs of which activities they should perform and 
similar demand around what these activities should contain. However different regional 
companies face diverse geographical markets. These geographical markets have different 
types of customers and various options of suppliers and partners, which have generated that 
the regional companies have chosen to perform the service in various ways.  
 
Thus, it is specifically one regional company, Länsförsäkringar Stockholm, which the focus is 
on in this study and which specific conditions form the basis for the opportunities that is 
raised in this study. Therefore, the study of the conditions that exist just for Länsförsäkringar 
Stockholm cannot lead to that a general conclusion can be drawn about the general factors 
affecting the choice of execution in all regional companies. At the same time, there is reason 
to discuss whether all regional companies should have an integrated strategy around what the 
purpose of the home inspections are and what it thus should contribute to. 
 




Franchisees       
The study of the current franchisees’ views of being able to offer additional products and 
services to their customers is, however, based on what the franchisees in the twelve county 
companies are asking for. It is likely that the franchisees’ demand and interest do not differ in 
different regional companies substantially due to their different markets. Instead it is likely 
that the difference in demand rather differ as a result of various conditions of a more personal 
nature. 
 
In the twelve regional companies, there are 137 franchises that offer life- and property 
insurance. Among these 137 franchisees there are 103 people working full-time with their 
business. This study is limited to only study the full-time worker franchisees’ views of an 
expanded franchise concept. 
 
In reality, it is probably not just Länsförsäkringar’s current franchisees in life- and property 
insurance that could constitute alternatives for the future franchisees who might be interested 
in being part of an extended franchise concept with examination. Potentially, even the actors 
that currently provide home inspections on the market could be potential franchisees. Many of 
these actors already have a functioning organization with great knowledge. At the same time 
these actors have difficulty getting any bigger turnover, largely because of a lesser known 
brand, which creates favorable conditions for a franchise concept with a great exchange 
between the parties. This study is, however, limited from including whether the actors who 
offer home inspections on the market today would be interested in being part of 
Länsförsäkringar’s franchise concept.  
 
Theory 
In the choice of execution of service, namely whether the best alternative is to perform a 
service in-house or outsourcing it, the Transaction Cost Theory is a possible and suitable 
approach. In the exchange between two parties transaction costs arises, for example to 
administer and implement the transaction. Through Vertical Integration, such as strategic 
alliances like franchising, actors can coordinate activities that have a common final propose, 
and thus increase the efficiency and reduce the costs. This reduces the incentive to spend 
resources, for example to control the other party, since a mutual control is created. 
 
The Theory of Transaction Costs is the study's main approach, but this is also supplemented 
with the Agency Theory. When two parties integrate vertically a contract normally is 
established between them to reduce the risk of misunderstandings and complications. These 
inter-organizational relationships can be problematic when the parties have different 
conditions, which are highlighted in the Agency Theory. For example, problems can arise by 
an uneven distribution of information or when one party is deceptive against the other. Lower 
costs for the agent and the principal can be achieved through that information is exchanged 
more equally between the parties. 
 
Empirical study  
The theories will form the basis for an empirical study that investigates Länsförsäkringar 
Stockholm’s existing franchisees’ interest to offer customers an expanded range of products 
and services. Thus, a questionnaire is sent out to the 103 franchisees that work full-time with 
their business.  
 
 






This study aims to provide theoretical explanations of Länsförsäkringar Stockholm’s 
opportunities to expand the franchise concept by including home insurance inspections, which 
today are outsourced to a high degree. In particular, the study examines whether the current 
franchisees in insurance are interested in broadening the franchise concept with additional 




In chapter 2, there is a statement of Länsförsäkringar’s operations and in particular how the 
inspections of newly signed houses are performed today within Länsförsäkringar Stockholm. 
Furthermore, chapter 3 is composed of a description of the theories that underpin the study; 
Transaction Cost Theory and Agency Theory. Based on these theories and the study’s 
problem a number of hypotheses are added which are going to be tested through the empirical 
study.  
 
Chapter 4 presents the empirical study’s approach and discusses how the choice of approach 
affects the result. Chapter 5 presents the results and analyzes of the empirical study through 
the questionnaire. Chapter 6 consists of a discussion of the empirical data with a theoretical 











2 Business descriptions - Länsförsäkringar 
 
2.1 The Länsförsäkringar Alliance 
 
Länsförsäkringar is a unique insurance and banking group seen to that it is both customer-
owned and locally based (Internet, Länsförsäkringar, 3, 2015). The Länsförsäkringar Alliance 
consists of 23 independent regional insurance companies (regional companies) owned by its 
3.5 million property insurance customers (Internet, Länsförsäkringar, 4, 2015). The regional 
companies provide security to customers' home by caring for their money and security. 
Through the regional companies the decisions within the Länsförsäkringar Alliance are 
decentralized greatly, while the regional companies work together and have a common 
business through its subsidiary Länsförsäkringar AB (Internet, Länsförsäkringar, 3, 2015). 
Thus, the Länsförsäkringar Alliance, in the legal sense, is not a group with group management 
and group functions at the top. Instead Länsförsäkringar can be seen as a federation, and can 






















Länsförsäkringar's history dates from 1801 when the first regional company, Länsförsäkringar 
Kronoberg, was formed which was followed by formations of additional regional companies 
(Internet, Länsförsäkringar, 4, 2015). In 1917 the collaboration between regional companies 
began that currently takes place through the jointly owned Länsförsäkringar AB. From the 
beginning, this collaboration primarily was focused on experience (Internet, Länsförsäkringar, 
5, 2015). Today the interaction is rooted in the creating of conditions for regional companies 
to be successful in their respective markets. Currently Länsförsäkringar AB serves as the 
nexus for conducting strategic development and as a provider of services to the regional 
companies in areas that create efficiencies and economies of scale. 
 
Länsförsäkringar AB's mission is to conduct the Länsförsäkringar Alliance’s joint insurance 
and banking (Länsförsäkringar, 5, 2015). In addition to Länsförsäkringar AB, regional 
companies also have common ownership of the subsidiary Länsförsäkringar’s real estate 
3.5 million customers
















Figure 1: The Länsförsäkringar Alliance’s structure (Source: Länsförsäkringar, own processing) 




agency, which thus is separate from Länsförsäkringar AB. In turn, the Länsförsäkringar 
Alliance includes Länsförsäkringar bank, Länsförsäkringar property insurance, 





In total the Länsförsäkringar Alliance’s operating income was 1.47 billion SEK in 2014 and 
all business segments strengthened the results (Internet, Länsförsäkringar, 4, 2015). Among 
Länsförsäkringar's business segments insurance is greatest (Internet, Länsförsäkringar, 1, 
2015). The business within property insurance is conducted within health insurance, animal 
insurance and transportation insurance and certain responsibility, property and motor 
insurance (Internet, Länsförsäkringar, 6, 2015). Länsförsäkringar’s life insurance conducts 
traditional life insurance. For property insurance Länsförsäkringar has a market share of 30 
percent, which is a leading position on the Swedish market (see Figure 2) (Internet, Svensk 
försäkring, 2015). Every second house and housing cooperative in Sweden, as well as every 




















Länsförsäkringar’s business segment linked insurance has a market share of twelve percent, 
while the market share is ten percent for the real estate agency. For premium income of life 
insurance Länsförsäkringar has a market share of over eight percent, while the market share 
for banking is five percent (Internet, Svensk försäkring, 2015).  
 
2.3 Länsförsäkringar’s franchise organization 
 
Länsförsäkringar has developed two franchise concepts within the organization, since both 
Länsförsäkringar’s real estate agency and Länsförsäkringar’s life- and property insurance are 
performed under franchise concepts (pers.comm. Johansson). Länsförsäkringar 
Fastighetsförsmedling was started in 2006 and is, like the two largest players (Swedbank and 
Svensk Fastighetsförsmedling) on the market for real estate agency, executed through a 
franchise concept (Internet, Svenska Dagbladet, 2015). Today Länsförsäkringar’s real estate 
 
Figure 2: Insurance companies’ market share in Sweden in property insurance 
(Source: Svensk försäkring, own processing) 




agency is Sweden’s third largest provider of real estate agency with its 158 offices around the 
country (Internet, Länsförsäkringar, 6, 2015).  
 
The franchise organization of insurance within Länsförsäkringar started in 1998, when 
Länsförsäkringar acquired Wasa, which today is a subsidiary of Länsförsäkringar Bank AB 
(pers.comm. Johansson). Some part of Wasa had already since 1984 been under a franchise 
organization.  The acquisition of Wasa resulted in an investigation that led to 
recommendations on development, attitudes and a franchise strategy. For example this 
investigation resulted in the positions adopted that respective regional company has the 
customer responsibility and liability for the franchise, as a whole. Furthermore, it should be 
clearly stated that the franchisee represents Länsförsäkringar in marketing and customer 
relations. Moreover it was advised that questions about the policy, identity, franchise 
concepts, remuneration structures, etc. should be treated on a common level for all regional 
companies. Finally, a further recommendation was that the Franchise Council shall be 
responsible for the management of Länsförsäkringar’s franchise strategy. 
 
Today the franchise organization in insurance is executed in twelve of the 23 regional 
companies, of which eleven have both life- and property franchisees (pers.comm. Johansson). 
All these regional companies have franchisees in the corporate market, four in the private 
market and three of them have franchisees engaged in farming franchise. Länsförsäkringar has 
123 franchisees that, in turn, on average have one person employed. 
 
Länsförsäkringar’s franchise concept for insurance is based on the franchise agreement that is 
made between regional companies and franchisee (pers.comm. Johansson). Around this 
franchise concept, Länsförsäkringar has built up a franchise organization, through a Franchise 
Committee and a Franchise Council. The Franchise Committee constitutes an opportunity for 
consultations between Länsförsäkringar and franchisees in global issues such as the continued 
development of policies, concepts, standard contracts and a handbook of the concept. 
Länsförsäkringar’s Franchise Council includes representatives from regional companies and 
managers of Länsförsäkringar’s Franchise Support. This Council determines the 
organization's franchise strategy and franchise policy. In addition, the Franchise Council 
conducts work that aims to support the franchisors and franchisees to increase sales, brand 
image and to achieve greater customer satisfaction and compliance with regulations. The 
franchise organization, with accompanying Franchise Support, accounts for control, the 
operating of the franchise manual and the implementation of skills development. 
Länsförsäkringar’s vision is to always have the most attractive franchise concept in the 
corporate market. 
 
2.4 Länsförsäkringar Stockholm 
 
Länsförsäkringar Stockholm's history started in 1844 when the organization began to insure 
people and objects (Internet, Länsförsäkringar, 7, 2015). As people's changing lifestyles and 
needs, the supply has expanded and evolved. Since the customer is the owner all activities of 
the organization are adapted to meet customers’ ownership interests. The customers who have 
property insurance with Länsförsäkringar Stockholm elect representatives to represent them in 
the General Council (see Figure 3). In turn, the General Council has the task to appoint the 
Board of Directors. Länsförsäkringar Stockholm's board is responsible for the organization, 
management and appoints the organization's CEO. Länsförsäkringar Stockholm’s CEO 
appoints a management team with ongoing responsibility for different parts of the business.  
 



















In comparison with the other 22 regional companies, Länsförsäkringar Stockholm employs 
most people (327 people), second to Länsförsäkringar Skåne (Internet, Länsförsäkringar, 4, 
2015). The year of 2014 became one of the strongest years in long time for Länsförsäkringar 
Stockholm, since the operating profit amounted to 465 million SEK (Internet, 
Länsförsäkringar, 8, 2015). This strong year can be attributed to reduced operating costs, 
increased sales and significantly lower damage costs. 
  
The increased sales and reduced operating costs can be attributed to a change in 
Länsförsäkringar’s distribution, increasing customer processing and more efficient working 
methods (Internet, Länsförsäkringar, 8, 2015). Within the Länsförsäkringar Alliance a new 
offer to customers in insurance and finance has been launched. This new offer has, together 
with improved working methods, led to that more of the customers of Länsförsäkringar’s real 
estate agency also choose to insure and finance their new property within Länsförsäkringar.  
 
2.5 Home insurance inspections 
 
Home insurance is one of the property insurances that Länsförsäkringar Stockholm, and the 
other regional companies, offers (Internet, Länsförsäkringar, 9, 2015). When a customer signs 
home insurance with Länsförsäkringar Stockholm the insurance provides a basic protection 
for his/her home and the persons. In the next step, the home insurance can be combined with 
any type of resident insurance, such additional home insurance or condominium insurance. 
Finally, the insurance can be maximized by a supplementary insurance. 
  
When a customer has signed a home insurance Länsförsäkringar Stockholm wants to execute 
a home inspection to investigate the house's current condition and thus become aware of the 
risks that the house is associated with (pers.comm. Öhman). The home inspection contributes 
also to damage prevention and thereby Länsförsäkringar can limit the risk of future damage 
such as fire- and water injury. If the home inspection shows that the house already has been 
afflicted with shortcomings, the inspection can result in that the responsibility for the damage 
can be imposed on the owner of the house’s former insurer. 
 
The risks that an object is associated with can emerge depending on the construction or age of 
the house. The investigation forms the basis for whether the insurance company chooses to 
Full Value Insure the object. For Full Value Insured objects there is no insurance amount that 
borders the damage compensation (Internet, Länsförsäkringar, 2, 2015). Since the pricing of 
 
 
Figure 3: Länsförsäkringar Stockholm’s organization and management  
(Source: Länsförsäkringar, own processing) 




insurance is based on the risk a "normal object" is associated with, Länsförsäkringar 
Stockholm considers that objects that fall outside the normal risk situation should be adjusted 
(pers.comm. Öhman). 
 
Länsförsäkringar Stockholm has categorized different objects by some criteria, which 
determines whether a house is going to be home inspected (pers.comm. Öhman). In this study, 
the different categories are named by the numbers 1, 2 and 3, where number 1 is associated 
with the lowest risk and number 3 with the highest risk. 
 
Länsförsäkringar Stockholm acts after the starting point that houses that are newly built or up 
to two years old are not associated with any specific risk and thereby Länsförsäkringar 
Stockholm do not to inspect these houses at all (Category 1) (pers.comm. Öhman). 
 
Länsförsäkringar Stockholm considers that houses over 250 square meters and/or houses that 
are built before 1930 falls outside the normal risk (Category 3) (pers. Comm. Öhman). 
Thereby Länsförsäkringar performs home inspections of those objects in-house by studying 
the houses’ condition, construction and reconstruction value. If significant lavish renovation 
has been done Länsförsäkringar provides the property owner to insure the property for a fixed 
amount, through a First Risk Insurance, instead of a Full Value Insurance. In this way the risk 
spectrum become regulated for these objects that are not assumed to fall within the normal 
risk. The First Risk Insurance implies that Länsförsäkringar will cash regulate any future 
damage to the amount set at the signing of the insurance. Objects with full value do not have 
an amount limit for maximum compensation. If these houses are affected by fire damage the 
starting point is, according to the damage assessment rules, that Länsförsäkringar is 
responsible for building up the affected house with rational methods and materials. 
 
The properties that Länsförsäkringar Stockholm will insure, but which do not fall within any 
of the categories mentioned above, Länsförsäkringar considers fall within the normal risk 
(Category 2) (Pers.comm. Öhman). Thereby Länsförsäkringar Stockholm considers that the 
risk pictures of these houses do not need to be adjusted. Länsförsäkringar offers these 
property owners a signing of a supplementary insurance that an external supplier in turn 
deliver. This supplementary insurance includes an execution of home inspection by the 
external supplier and thereby Länsförsäkringar ensures that even these houses become 
inspected.  Thus, the external supplier investigates if the property has an ongoing damage or 
how big the risk is for future shortcomings. This makes the property owner enlightened about 
what measures should be taken, while Länsförsäkringar Stockholm gets a protocol which 
assists in the event of a process of claims settlement.  
 
2.6 Summarized description 
 
Home inspections can be described as a way for insurance companies to be aware of the risks 
a house is associated with. Länsförsäkringar Stockholm estimates that almost all newly signed 
properties should be inspected. Depending on to which risk category an object falls, 
Länsförsäkringar considers there is different weight that damage prevention, through home 
inspection, is performed. In summary objects in Category 1 (new houses) are not home 
inspected at all, while both objects from Category 2 (house with normal risk) and 3 (house 
outside normal risk) does.  
 
One difference between the home inspections, which are carried out for the two categories, is 
that Länsförsäkringar executes the home inspection of Category 3 in-house, while 




Länsförsäkringar ensures that properties within Category 2 be inspected by the customers’ 
sign of a supplementary insurance. Thereby the home inspections in Category 2 indirectly are 
outsourced. Through the boundaries of risk categories that Länsförsäkringar Stockholm does 
there is a risk that some insurance are not subscribed ultimate in Category 2, and that 
properties be Full Value Insured, instead of to subscribe a First Risk Insurance. Further the 
damage prevention is more limited when it is outsourced. At the same time you always have 
to draw the line somewhere to get efficiency. The question for this study is whether today’s 
performing of the execution of home inspections is the best way or if home inspection 
possible could be performed under a franchise concept, given that home inspection is closely 












































3.1 Vertical Integration 
 
Integration contributes to that the activities between the actors in a value chain can be better 
coordinated (Nilsson, 1991). Through integration, the parties in a cooperation that is 
characterized by uncertainty achieve a higher degree of coordination because the boundaries 
between the parties get extended at sacrifice of a lower degree of autonomy. In this way, the 
parties’ mutual control of each other's activities get greater which use to be demanded when 
parties in a value chain are highly interdependent.  
 
When the output of an activity in a value chain is well suited as input into the next activity, 
the parties are well integrated with each another (Nilsson, 1991). In this situation, the latter 
activity, with use of the input from the first, is carried out effectively and with good goal 
achievement as a result. This coordination can be achieved in different ways. In the market, 
two extreme forms, market mechanism and the central planning, are distinguished. These two 
forms can be described as the extremes on an axis which has many intermediary forms. The 
intermediary forms consist of various degrees of combinations between the extreme forms, 

















Market mechanism is the extreme form when no integration exists (Nilsson, 1991). In this 
situation the parties, whom try to coordinate some activities, are totally independent. 
Coordination is instead achieved by the parties voluntarily adapt to each other on the basis of 
the information that is exchanged. This exchange is based on "coordination by feedback", 
which means that adaptation takes place along the information that parties provide to each 
other regarding the experience of the previous adaptation measure. The precondition for this 
coordination to work is that there is free competition in the market, so that power is dispersed. 
When market mechanism exists no party has power enough to control the other party. 
 
The opposite to market mechanism is central control, which is the extreme form when there is 
full integration between the parties (Nilsson, 1991). In this extreme form coordination is 
achieved through "coordination by plan". When this market mechanism exists has one of the 
parties full control over the other, and is thus able to require him/her to adapt. In this situation 
there is complete concentration of power. 
Figure 4: Scale of integration (Source: Nilsson, 1991, own processing) 
 




Partial integration represents the whole range that is available between extreme forms, which 
meaning that coordination is done through a combination between market mechanism and 
central control (Nilsson, 1991). Thus, the parties partly are independent from each other and 
partially are integrated. At partial integration cooperation is more or less associated with 
competition, which means that the parties have control over each other to various degrees. 
Thus, the power in some form of partial integration is either completely dispersed or 
completely concentrated. 
 
Between actors it can be distinguished different types of integration, depending on what 
relationships the parties who are co-ordinate with each other have (Nilsson, 1991). Within 
integrations where different actors in a particular direction, and thus at the same level in the 
value chain, provide coordination through a joint decision is called horizontal integration. 
When the actors that instead are within the same value chain, where one party’s output 
becomes another's input, achieves a degree of central control occurs vertical integration.  
 
Examples of vertical integration is when different parties, which previously have had their 
own home inspection activities, will merge under a franchise concept and interacts with a 
third party (the franchisor) who is the owner of the concept. In this case coordination is 
achieved between the stage of the value chain where there is a demand that the home 
inspection is been made (Länsförsäkringar Stockholm) and the stage in the value chain that 
performs the actual inspection (franchisees). Franchising is an example of a collaborative 
solution where the partners conduct individual activities under a single brand. 
 
3.2 Transaction Cost Theory 
 
Transaction cost theory describes why it under certain conditions of inter-organizational 
relationships exist differently integration degrees (Nilsson, 1991; Nilsson and Björklund, 
2003). Besides the cost (purchase price) for the purchased/sold product additional costs in 
terms of transaction costs arise (Nilsson, 1991). To achieve certain coordination actors choose 
the coordination solution that delivers the lowest possible transaction cost. Each transaction is 
associated with transaction costs to plan, negotiate, administer, implement and control the 
transaction. These activities are carried out to reduce uncertainty and risk in the inter-
organizational relationship. In an interaction the risk always is that the counterparty is acting 
deceptive, for example by not keeping what is agreed. Actors can by having a greater focus on 
information gathering, contract writing and so on, to some extent reduce these risks. 
 
The activities performed in connection with a transaction, which result in transaction costs, 
are more or less necessary, depending on the transaction (Nilsson, 1991). An actor who has 
high transaction costs in a given market situation are more inclined to integrate. The 
transaction costs must be balanced with the rising bureaucracy costs, which arise from 
increased integration. Examples of bureaucracy costs are increased administrative expenses 
and insensitivity to external changes. Thus the appropriate level of integration is determined 
by the relation between transaction costs and bureaucracy costs in a specific market situation. 
A business is seeking to minimize the sum of production and transaction costs (Nilsson, 1991; 
Nilsson and Björklund, 2003). This decision fits the choice of coordination solution, including 
whether the company should carry out the production or service in-house or outsource it. 
Sometimes some type of integration is the optimal solution.  
 
 




3.2.1 Human factors  
 
Transaction costs arise as a result of both human factors and environmental factors (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 2003). The human factors that influence the rise of transaction costs can partly 
be attributed to the fact human actors are subject to bounded rationality and opportunism 
behavior (Williamson, 1981).  
 
If the human actors had been fully rational, they had chosen to gather complete information 
prior to every decision and all economic exchange had been effectively organized by contracts 
(Williamson, 1981). Instead the human actors are bounded rational. Since there is a cost to 
collect and process information, the human actors choose which specific decisions they 
prioritize. In addition to this priority the human actors are moreover limited in its ability to 
understand its complex business environment. This bounded rationality causes incomplete 
information, information asymmetries, between the parties, which contribute to higher 
transaction costs. 
 
Human actors are given to behave opportunistically due to that each operator primarily is 
interested in making decisions after what is best for him/her (Williamson, 1981). This 
behavior can sometimes cause a party to act opportunistic and be looking for its own good, 
which creates scope for him/her to be ready to act fraudulently in order to achieve its purpose. 
In cases with interaction between two parties, there is always a risk and uncertainty associated 
with these human factors, which create incentives to allocate resources to counter them. This 
allocation of resources generates higher transaction costs. 
 
3.2.2 Environmental factors 
 
Transaction costs are arising as a result of environmental factors and thereby as a result of the 
characteristics of the transaction’s activity or situation (Williamson, 1981). Foremost among 
these characteristics that affect transactions are asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency 
(Williamson, 1981; Feng et al., 2013).  
 
Since no complex contracts are complete the contracting actors take risks in their cooperation 
(Feng et al., 2013). This risk is extra obvious for a party that, due to the cooperation, requires 
investments in transaction-specific assets. The party that carries investments in assets that are 
directly tied to this specific transaction or this specific transaction party has, from several 
aspects, been locked into the transaction, and is thereby more or less superfluous if the 
cooperation ends (Nilsson and Björklund, 2003; Feng et al., 2013). An investment can be 
resource-bound seen to that it only is suitable for a certain type of production or to a specific 
geographical location. Other examples are when the investment is made in human resources, 
which are knowledge capital. Since there is a risk that the actor who may make this 
transaction-specific investment is locked in precisely this cooperation his/her options of 
possible partners is limited (Nilsson, 1991). If the counterparty acts fraudulently, he/she can 
exploit the situation and in its power obtain advantages at the expense of the other party. If 
both parties instead are dependent of this transaction the risk for fraudulent behavior is 
reduced.  
 
For example, the franchisee's level of dependence on Länsförsäkringar is different depending 
on the franchisee's alternative choice of partners. A franchisee who already has built up 
knowledge in insurance and who now also invest knowledge capital in home inspections is 
largely tied to a continued cooperation with an insurance company which both demand 
 




execution of sale of insurance and execution of home inspections. A franchisee who has 
previously conducted its own home inspection activity has instead already made investments 
in knowledge capital within home inspection and has always the option to work with 
inspection in any other business. 
 
Uncertainty is also a result of imperfect contracting and when the adjustment between the 
parties is not done satisfactorily (Feng et al., 2013). In transactions costs are incurred as a 
result of the uncertainty and complexity that is associated with the activity itself and in the 
process where the activities that should be carried out are defined (Nilsson, 1991). Thus, there 
is both uncertainty that is linked to the actual situation and its complexities and uncertainties 
partly due to communication difficulties between the parties that are involved. An actor who 
experience uncertainty in its operations may have reason to integrate vertically, and thereby 
reducing the transaction costs. The integration contributes to that the actors get control over 
each other, which reduces the uncertainty. 
 
Lastly transactions’ characters are influenced by the frequency that the transaction is 
associated with, videlicet the frequency with which transactions recur (Williamson, 1981; 
Nilsson, 1991). If the transaction occurs with low frequency, the incentives to protect 
themselves against the transaction costs, through any level of integration, are too expensive 
(Nilsson, 1991). In this case, the total amount of resources required to establish a stronger 
relationship are higher than the low frequency but these result in high transaction cost, not 
least because the actual establishment of an integrated business is risky. 
 
3.2.3 Transaction cost’s size 
 
The size of transaction costs are determined by the degree of uncertainty that the transaction is 
associated with, the presence of transaction-specific investments and the level of the 
frequency of the transaction (Williamson, 1981; Nilsson and Björklund, 2003; Feng et al., 
2013). Moreover the transaction costs’ size is affected by the factors externalities and 
hierarchical decomposition (Williamson, 1981; Nilsson 1991; Nilsson and Björklund, 2003). 
 
A single actor’s decision of the execution of a transaction does not fit whether his/her 
decision has external effects, positive and/or negative, on other operators (Williamson, 1981; 
Nilsson 1991; Nilsson and Björklund, 2003). Because these effects are not contained in the 
individual operator calculus, he/she has no reason to consider the indirect and long-term 
consequences of its actions. A solution to the market mechanism that does not work, is when 
the actors who are affected by each other's effects acting collectively, by some form of 
integration. In this way, negative externalities are reduced while positive can be promoted, 
which results in lower transaction costs in the long term. 
 
In a value chain the actors’ transaction costs can be reduced by hierarchical decomposition, 
when related activities in the value chain are broken down according to their optimal sizes 
(Williamson, 1981; Nilsson 1991; Nilsson and Björklund, 2003). Since some parts of a 
production activity are characterized by economies of scale, while others are characterized by 
the opposite, diseconomies of scale, it sometimes can be the most economically efficient to 
place these activities in different organizations. The risk is, however, that the two activity 
types are so closely linked that it is difficult to perform them completely separate. 
 
Partial integration can be a solution to this situation and thereby the activities are performed 
along their optimal sizes and are well integrated with each other (Nilsson, 1991). Franchising 




is a good example of this, since a large organization stands for the activities where economies 
of scale are important, while smaller organizations perform the activities that are beneficial to 
carry out small scale. At the same time there is integration between the parties. Cooperatives 
work at a similarly way, which Länsförsäkringar is an example of. Within the 
Länsförsäkringar Alliance the activities that are suited for small operations (for example client 
meetings) are performed in regional companies, while activities that are well suited for 
economies of scale (for example strategic development) are performed by a larger 
organization, Länsförsäkringar AB. 
 
3.3 Agency Theory 
 
In a value chain, or between parties within a company, there are several sources of conflicts 
(Coughlan et al., 2006). One of these conflicts is different, or even competing, goals which 
can be described by the Agency Theory. In addition, problems occur when the agent (the 
contractor) and the principal (the client) do not know who the respective parties’ real goals 
and interests are (Bogetoft and Olesen, 2004). These conflicts and problems arise on the basis 
of assumptions about individual utility maximization, bounded rationality and information 
asymmetry (Nilsson and Björklund, 2003). 
 
Individual utility maximization is based on that a conflict is created by the premise that 
decisions are taken with regard to a party’s own benefit and interest, rather than a starting 
point on the entire value chain’s or organization’s best (Nilsson and Björklund, 2003). 
Competing goals create conflicts in the relationship between the agent and the principal 
regardless of the relationship that is regardless of the parties' personalities or the past 
experiences of their relationship (Coughlan et al, 2006). Conflicts such as these lead too often 
to that the parties personify the conflict and believe that the solution is to discontinue the 
relationship and initiate a new one. The fundamental conflict normally remains anyway. 
 
In a relationship between an agent and a principal, the agent has been commissioned to act in 
the principal's interest (Nilsson and Björklund, 2003). To increase the probability that the 
project is carried out properly a contract often is written between the parties. Despite this 
action, it may be difficult for the principal to prevent that the agent does not act in its own 
interest. Since human beings are subject to bounded rationality all complex contracts are 
unavoidably incomplete (Williamson, 2002). The contracts are also costly to establish, 
maintain and monitor (Nilsson and Björklund, 2003). In a situation where the parties are 
bounded rational and where each party's goal is individual utility maximization, there is a risk 
for opportunistic behavior. These limitations of rationality are probably not the same for both 
parties, since they normally do not have access to the same information, which makes the 
existence of information asymmetry (Nilsson and Björklund, 2003; Bogetoft and Olesen, 
2004). When information asymmetry exits, there is a greater risk that the party with more 
information exploits the situation to his/her advantage.  
 
The situation between the agent and the principal may give rise to various costs. For the 
principal inspection costs arises since he/she adds resources to manage and control the agent 
(Nilsson and Björklund, 2003; Bogetoft and Olesen, 2004). These control costs are incurred 
both in the design of contracts and in follow-up of the contract compliance. The agent, in turn, 
has assurance costs for a variety of resources deployed to convince the principal that he/she 
acts in the principal's interests. 
 




3.4 Previous studies 
 
In previous studies, empirical analysis has been made of the interaction between franchisors 
and franchisees through the Transaction Cost Theory and the Agency Theory. For example, 
researchers have investigated the autonomy of the franchisee and transaction-specific factors 
that influence this choice. In the next step, studies have been made on how a change in the 
autonomy of the franchisee contributes to increased agency costs. Further, studies have been 
made of the environmental influences on the structures of networks. Finally, a study has been 
made concerning how the franchisor should manage his/her superiority of power over the 
franchisee, based on the entire franchise chain's best.  
 
Transaction costs. López-Bayón and López-Fernández (2011) study which areas franchisors 
should leave to the franchisees and which ones should be performed by the franchisee. The 
starting point to this study is to increase the franchise chain's performance and in particular to 
reduce the risk to the franchisor fosters early termination of the cooperation. An expanded 
autonomy of the franchisee contributes partly to the positive effect that the franchise chain can 
utilize the franchisee's local knowledge, and partly to the negative impact that it may impair 
the franchise concept's homogeneity. 
 
The authors show that it is advantageous if decisions regarding assortment and local 
advertising are delegated to the franchisees, since it tends to reduce the risk of early 
termination of the cooperation. Pricing decisions in contrast, tend instead to increase the risk 
of early termination of the interaction if those are delegated to the franchisee. 
 
Mumdziev and Windsperger (2011) aim to expand the strategies in terms of transaction costs 
by connect it with the allocation of decision rights in franchise chains. In particular, the 
uncertainty in the transaction cost variables behavior (human factors), environment and 
investments in transaction specific assets are investigated. In next step these variables are 
related to whether the franchisor delegates decision rights. The conclusion of this empirical 
study is that when the franchisee has large transactions specific assets, as a result of the 
cooperation with the franchisor, the franchisor is willing to reduce the formal control. In these 
cases the franchisee thus tends to delegate the decision-making to the franchisee. When the 
franchisor instead feels that there is environmental uncertainty, the franchisor rather entrusts 
decision rights to the franchisee. Finally, when the franchisor experiences that it is difficult to 
monitor the franchisee's behavior due to human factors and measure its performance, the 
franchisor tends to delegate the decision to the franchisee. 
 
Arranz and Arroyabe’s (2007) study focuses on governance structures within technological 
networks through the transaction cost theory. An overall conclusion is that the form of 
governance is more hierarchical when the technological network has made major transaction 
specific investments, has higher uncertainty and greater frequency. 
 
Inspection costs. Cochet et al. (2007) consider that a franchise chain where the franchisee has 
autonomy promotes the entire franchise chain's adaptability and efficiency. This autonomy, 
however, also contributes to increased inspection costs which arise as a result of a 
misalignment between the franchiser’s and the franchisee's interests. The study's empirical 
results provide strong support to that franchise chains can balance the loss of control that the 
franchisor gets by relational governance mechanisms. Formal control mechanisms are direct 
as explicit contract terms, but this mechanism counteracts usually not all vulnerabilities of the 
organizational goal conflicts. Relational Forms of Governance instead counteracts the 




cooperation from potential conflicts through an indirect control. This control occurs through 
unwritten codes of conduct and norms of behavior. The worse the agent's goal matches the 
entire franchise chain's goal, the more important this relational governance is to reduce these 
inspection costs.  
 
The authors also present factors that reduce the negative effect of conflicting goals within a 
franchise chain. Cochet et al. (2007 p.2) define these factors as "multi-unit ownership, age of 
the franchise-franchisor relationship, geographic distance between the outlet and the 
company’s head office, franchisees’ past economic success and the level of perceived intra-
chain competition". 
 
Agency Theory. Ehrman and Spranger (2005) find that the franchisee is sensitive to 
opportunistic behavior both before and after the signing of a contract. When a contract is 
signed between the agent (franchisee) and the principal (the franchisor) parts of the contract 
give the agent directly mandatory and other parts gives the agent non-mandatory conditions 
and requirements. This is creating an asymmetrical allocation within the franchise chain. The 
agent only has little opportunity to make counterclaims, which initially creates a situation 
where the agent is sensitive to opportunistic behavior from the principal's side. For example, a 
higher uncertainty for the agent is created when the principal offers longer contract terms and 
when the agent is provided financial assistance by the principal. In this way the principal 
creates dependence for the agent to continue the cooperation, while the franchisor has room to 
behave opportunistically.  
 
The empirical analysis by Ehrman and Spranger (2005) indicates that the franchisor should 
not use this power advantage by behaving opportunistically. Instead, a stronger growth in a 
franchise chain is created if the franchisor cooperates with the franchisee and operates in a 
credible way to alleviate this asymmetry. For example, the franchisor counters this imbalance 
through the adaptations of contracts, organization and economy. Furthermore, the franchisor 
should not control the franchisee by coercive means to a large extent. Instead, it is better for 
the entire franchise chain, and for each party in the long term, if the situation develops into a 





Based on the problem, theory and previous studies in the area seven hypotheses have been 
developed. The hypotheses are related to the theory, where the first two areas are linked to the 
Transaction Cost Theory and the third area is linked to the Agency theory. The result of these 
hypotheses provides theoretical explanations to Länsförsäkringar’s opportunities to expand 
the franchise concept. These opportunities, and in particular the franchisees’ viewpoints to the 
current and future cooperation with Länsförsäkringar, have been studied by the survey. Each 
hypothesis consists of two variables that constitute one respective question/statement in the 
questionnaire. 
 
Environmental uncertainty and vertical integration  
The uncertainty about further cooperation due to the environment can be reduced for 
Länsförsäkringar and the franchisees if the parties become more integrated with each other, 
which can be attained through an expanded franchise concept. In collaborations that are 
associated with uncertainty, the party who experience the greatest uncertainty has the biggest 




reason to integrate vertically and in that way reduce its transaction costs. The parties' 
uncertainty gets reduced when they get a higher degree of control over each other. 
If Länsförsäkringar or the franchisees perceive that the other party gets increased incentive to 
continue the cooperation, thanks to an expanded franchise concept, is even that party willing 
to become more dependent of a continued cooperation. When both parties are dependent on 
the continued collaboration creates conditions for a situation where no party can exploit the 
other. 
 
H1a: The less Länsförsäkringar is dependent on a continued cooperation today, the more the 
franchisees want to become integrated and expand the franchise concept.  
 
H1b: The more an expanded franchise concept increases Länsförsäkringar’s willingness for a 
continued cooperation, the more the franchisees want to become integrated and expand the 
franchise concept.   
Uncertainty and investments in transaction specific assets 
Franchisees that perceive that their knowledge within insurance is highly transaction-specific 
are also experience dependence to a continued cooperation. In such case the franchisee would 
be even more interested in to create a wider cooperation. Further it, from the franchisees’ 
perspective, would be positive if even Länsförsäkringar become more dependent to a 
continued cooperation, so that interdependence is created. Such a situation would in fact 
create a smaller uncertainty for the franchisees about a future cooperation. 
 
H2a: The more transaction-specific the franchisees perceive that their knowledge of insurance 
is, the more attractive an expanded franchise concept is for them. 
 
H2b: The more an expanded franchise concept leads to interdependence, the more attractive 
an expanded franchise concept is for the franchisees. 
Uncertainty due to human factors and agency costs 
Franchise chains where the franchisor and the franchisees have different or even conflicting 
goals are less effective collaborations. In these partnerships the franchisor cannot provide the 
franchisee any greater autonomy, without generating significant agency costs. 
If a franchise chain consists of an integration of multiple goals the problem of this can be 
damped for example when the cooperation has lasted over a longer period, when the 
franchisee is satisfied with their financial situation as well as when the franchisees do not 
perceive that there is a great competition towards other franchisees and/or Länsförsäkringar’s 
employees within insurance. If an adaption has been made between Länsförsäkringar’s and 
the franchisees’ interests, it can be advantageous for the entire franchise chain’s efficiency 
and adaptability if Länsförsäkringar allows the franchisees more autonomy, without 
generating significant agent costs.  
 
H3a: The further the cooperation between Länsförsäkringar and the franchisees has lasted, the 
greater the adaptation between the parties’ interests has been. 
 
H3b: The more satisfied the franchisees are of their economic situation, the greater the 
adaptation between Länsförsäkringar’s and the franchisees’ interests has been. 
 
H3c: The less intra-chain competition the franchisees perceive, the greater the adaptation 
between Länsförsäkringar and the franchisees’ interests has been.  






4.1 The choice of methodology  
 
The study aims to investigate Länsförsäkringar Stockholm’s possibilities to perform home 
inspections under a franchise concept. To study these possibilities, it is essential to examine 
who might be interested in being franchisees, and how they regard their situation today and in 
the future. A limitation is that this study examines only the current franchisees of 
Länsförsäkringar’s interest in expanding the current range of products and services. Thereby 
the option other stakeholders would be interested in being franchisees is disregarded.  
 
Today there are 137 franchisees that offer life- and property insurance under the brand 
Länsförsäkringar. This study is limited to only study the interest of the franchisees who work 
full-time with their business. Within Länsförsäkringar there are 103 franchisees who work full 
time with their operations, which therefore can be seen as the total population of the study. 
Usually, it is difficult to collect data from all that are included in a population (Denscombe, 
2009). Instead, a selection is made, and hopefully this result will be consistent with the rest of 
the population. In this study, however, no selection needs to be made because it is possible to 
reach out to the entire population. 
 
The approach of a study such as this could for example be a survey or a case study. Survey is 
the research strategy that has been the basis for this study because many units can be covered 
(Denscombe, 2009). In next step a survey like this can result in that an overview can be 
provided of the current conditions at this specific time. An advantage of case studies is that a 
wider depth can be obtained in contrast to surveys that instead tend to win width to the loss of 
depth. Case studies tend to discover information which is based on an inductive logic, while 
the surveys usually follow a deductive logic in which theories are tested. This study follows 
the deductive logic since a theory investigation is performed, which along with aspects from 
previous studies constitute a basis for the formulation of a number of hypotheses. These 
hypotheses form a framework for the design of a questionnaire which is selected as the data 
collection technique of this survey. Examples of other data collection techniques when 
surveys fit as strategy are interviews, documents and observations. 
 
Questionnaires are most productive when the number of respondents is larger and then the 
respondents are located at different geographical locations, as well as when a standardized 
data is requested that does not require a personal interaction (Denscombe, 2009). The 
respondents in this study are located within twelve regional companies in Sweden, from 
Skåne to Norrland. The questions that will be asked in the questionnaire should not be 
controversial or extensive. In addition, the questionnaire is more productive if the majority of 
respondents are expected to be able to understand the questions, which is important when the 
researcher does not have the opportunity to ask follow-up questions. In this study, the risk that 
some of the respondents will misinterpret the questions is largely limited, since the population 
consists of a more homogeneous group of entrepreneurs who are all franchisees to 
Länsförsäkringar. Due to that the development of the questions have been done in interaction 
with Länsförsäkringar’s Franchise Council, who know the target group well, is reducing the 
risk that respondents will misunderstand the questions. 
 
Questionnaires have the advantages that they are easy to arrange, at the same time as they are 
economical because they provide a widespread basis of research data to a relatively small cost 




(Denscombe, 2009). Fundamental for questionnaires is that all respondents receive an 
identical set of questions, which provides standardized answers. Unlike the data collection 
technique interview, questionnaire gives data that cannot be contaminated by interpersonal 
factors.  
 
The disadvantages of questionnaires are for example that the researcher cannot ask follow-up 
questions to the respondents, as well as that the researcher does not have the opportunity to 
check the veracity of the respondents’ answers (Denscombe, 2009). Thus, the researcher 
cannot observe an inconsistency between the answers the respondent gives and a certain 
factor. Another disadvantage with questionnaires is that the respondents may perceive it as 
limiting and frustrating to answer a questionnaire that is usually designed with pre-coded 
response options, unlike interviews that usually consists of questions of open character. The 
risk is also that these pre-coded response options distort the results so that they do not reflect 
the respondents’ answers. 
 
Through a survey quantitative data is produced (Denscombe, 2009). The fundamental 
difference between quantitative method and qualitative method is that the quantitative data 
collection technique converts the information collected by respondents to numbers and 
amounts. In qualitative methods are the researcher's perception and interpretation of the 
informants’ answers form the basis of the study, which cannot or should not be converted to 
numbers (Holme and Solvang, 1997). A quantitative method is preferable for this study since 
the purpose is to be able to have a statement about this population, the population’s 
phenomena and the extent of a certain phenomenon. In the next step secure comparisons can 
be made and connections can be drawn.    
 
Based on the information that is collected in form of quantitative data, statistical 
generalizations can be made since the researcher, with some certainty, can have a statement 
of the population that has been studied. The design of questionnaires namely leads to 
standardization since all the study units get the same questions and the same response options. 
On the one hand, there is a risk that the respondent is governed by the response options to a 
certain degree, but on the other hand the standardized organization contributes to that 
generalization is possible.  
 
In some studies, a combination of approaches may be preferable when the weak and the 
strong points can cancel each other (Holme and Solvang, 1997). It is not unusual that a 
qualitative study sometimes constitute a preliminary investigation for the quantitative study. 
The data collection for this study began with interviews of Urban Johansson from 
Länsförsäkringar’s Franchise Council and an interview of Marie Öhman, Länsförsäkringar 
Stockholm. These interviews examined how today's franchise concept is structured and how 
the performance of home inspection is performed within Länsförsäkringar Stockholm today. 
This made the data collection qualitative initially, which gave a good preparation for the 
actual survey in the form of a questionnaire. This approach creates greater opportunities for a 
deeper understanding before the survey was designed, which reduces the risk that the 
information that is collected through the questionnaire is irrelevant.  
 
4.2 Web-based questionnaire 
 
The questionnaire can either be sent by post as postal surveys or performed by web-based 
questionnaires, which constituted the method that has been selected in this study 
(Denscombe, 2009). Web-based questionnaires have the advantages that they are convenient 




to distribute for the researcher and convenient to return for the respondents. For the researcher 
the web-based questionnaire facilitates the handling of the answers since they automatically 
can be entered into a spreadsheet program, which contributes to a quick work with more 
accurate answers.  
 
4.2.1 The structure of the questionnaire 
 
This study’s questionnaire follows, like most studies' questionnaire, a structure that is mainly 
composed of fixed questions, which allows only answers that fit into the categories that 
previously have been determined by the researcher (Denscombe, 2009). Among these fixed 
questions a small part of the questionnaire consists of the three answer options "yes", "no" and 
"do not know", while the majority of the questions consist of categorized questions with six 
possible answers. One of these alternatives are "do not know" and the rest consists of the 
numbers 1-5 in which the respondents are advised that "The higher number you select, the 
more you agree with the statement". The numbers correspond to the answers "Disagree", "Do 
not agree particularly well," "Neither or" "Agree rather well" and "Totally agree". 
 
A structure with mostly fixed questions creates a good structure since it generates uniform 
information that usefully can be quantified and compared. The disadvantages of fixed 
questions are, as previously stated, that the respondents have limited opportunities to provide 
answers that really match their experience. Thus, the result may be distorted somewhat, while 
there is a risk that the respondents are experiencing a frustration of not having the opportunity 
to express their views fully. 
 
Although most of the questions in this study’s questionnaire consist of fixed questions, these 
questions are supplemented with questions of open character where the respondents formulate 
the answers. In this way, the respondents have the opportunity to supplement their answer if 
he/she thinks that the questions have missed to take up any area. There are thereby several 
advantages to have open questions, but at the same time questions of open character requires a 
more time-consuming analysis.  
 
This study’s questionnaire has five sections. The first section consists of a number of 
background questions whose answers are facts, in form of factual information about the 
respondents’ age, number of years of cooperation, the type of insurance that he/she provides 
and so on. Section two aims to collect information about how the franchisees experience the 
current situation. Both the third and the fourth sections are connected to how the franchisees 
look to the future, while section four also examines the franchises’ settings to an extended 
franchise concept. The questionnaire ends by section five with an open question where the 
respondents have the opportunity to present further comments and complement their 
previously given answers. The most of the questions in this study’s questionnaire gives 
answers whose information can be viewed as opinions of the individual franchisee 
(Denscombe, 2009). In these answers, the respondents rather assess different situations and 
factors than describe pure facts.  
 
What answer the respondents enter on the last question in section three determines which 
ending questions the respondents get. The respondents who answer "yes" or "do not know" to 
the question "Do you perceive yourself as an entrepreneur who would be able to perform an 
expanded franchise concept with additional products/services?" answer the whole 
questionnaire and continue thereby with section four. The respondents who answer "no" to 
this question automatically skip question four and begin directly on section five. This 




approach was chosen because the questions in section four only involves the franchisees’ 
attitude to an expanded franchise concept, which is considered to be superfluous to answer for 
respondents who do not perceive that there is an option for them to perform an expanded 
franchise concept.  
 
The development of the questionnaire took in the first stage place on the basis of the theories 
and in next step in cooperation with Länsförsäkringar Stockholm and the Franchise Council. 
Thus, the questions have been tested by a handful of people within Länsförsäkringar, which 
reduces the risk for that the questions could be misinterpreted or irrelevant (Denscombe, 
2009). In the formulation of the questions it has been essential to balance to cover the most 
important areas with to create a not too extensive questionnaire to reduce the risk that 
respondents choose to refrain from answering. It is likely that many of the franchisees choose 
to participate in the survey largely due to that Länsförsäkringar stands as a sub-transmitter and 
thereby the franchisees see this questionnaire as an opportunity to express their views to their 
franchisor.  
 
4.2.2 The questionnaire’s relation to the hypotheses 
 
The seven hypotheses of the study can be derived under three theoretical fields within the 
Transaction Cost Theory and the Agency Theory. These hypotheses constitute the framework 
for the design of the questionnaire. Each hypothesis can be connected to two questions in the 




Hypotheses Questionnaire: question 1 Questionnaire: question 2 
H1a: Dependence, integration 
LF's dependence 
 of a continued cooperation 
The attractiveness of an expanded  
franchise concept for the franchisees 
H1b: Willingness, integration 
The attractiveness of an  
expanded franchise concept for LF 
The attractiveness of an expanded  
franchise concept for the franchisees 
H2a: Transaction-specific 
Whether the knowledge of insurance  
is transaction-specific 
The attractiveness of an expanded  
franchise concept for the franchisees 
H2b: Interdependence 
Whether an expanded franchise  
concept results in interdependence 
The attractiveness of an expanded  
franchise concept for the franchisees 
H3a: Cooperation, adaptation 
The length of the cooperation  
as franchisee and with LF at all The franchisees' perceived adaptation 
H3b: Economic, adaptation The satisfaction over the financial situation The franchisees' perceived adaptation 
H3c: Competition, adaptation 
The competition the franchisees  
experiencing against other 
 franchisees and LF's employees  The franchisees' perceived adaptation 
 
All the hypotheses are answered by the relationship between two questions in the 
questionnaire, except Hypothesis 3a and 3c where each hypothesis is answered by two 
separate relationships (see Table 1). In Hypothesis 3a the length of the cooperation with 
Länsförsäkringar is both related to the question in the questionnaire how long he/she has been 
a franchisee and the question how long the collaboration with Länsförsäkringar has been, 
including any years as an employee to Länsförsäkringar. Similarly, the eventual intra-chain 
competition that the franchisees experience can both arise in relation to other franchisees and 
in relation to the employees within insurance in Länsförsäkringar, which constitute two 
different questions in the questionnaire.  
 
Table 1: The relationship between the variables in the hypotheses and the questions in the questionnaire. 




4.2.3 Cover letter 
 
At the sending of the study's questionnaire Länsförsäkringar was undersign as a sub-
transmitter. The mail consisted of a cover letter and a link to the web-based questionnaire (see 
Appendix 1). In the cover letter it was described why it was valuable that the franchisees 
replied the questionnaire. Furthermore it was stated that the questionnaire expects to take 
about ten minutes to answer and that responses are anonymous. Finally it was described when 
the thesis will be published and when the deadline for answering the questionnaire is. In the 
cover letter were contact information to the author, Urban Johansson and the author’s 
supervisor so the respondent had the possibility to contact with any questions. 
 
Before this e-mail was sent to the franchisees, an e-mail where only Urban Johansson, from 
Länsförsäkringar’s Franchise Council, stood as the sender was sent (see Appendix 2). In this 
e-mail Urban Johansson described that an e-mail with a link to a web-based questionnaire 
would be sent to them within two days. He also briefly described why it is valuable for both 
the author and for Länsförsäkringar that they should answer the questionnaire.  
 
4.2.4 Sending and response rate 
 
Four sending of e-mails to the study’s population have been done. Firstly Urban Johansson 
sent a preparatory e-mail two days before the questionnaire was sent out. The first sending of 
the web-based questionnaire took place on Monday the 22
th
 of June in 2015 to 103 
franchisees. The franchisees were told that the deadline for answering the questionnaire is one 
week later. On Thursday the 25
th
 of June the second sending of the questionnaire was 
performed as a reminder e-mail (see Appendix 3) to the part of the population that has not 
completed the questionnaire yet. The third and final e-mail, with a reminder to complete the 
questionnaire, was sent to the part that by this date has not answered the questionnaire. This 
reminder e-mail was sent on Sunday the 28
th
 of June, which was the day before the deadline 
for answering the questionnaire. 
    
Before the first reminder was sent, 63 percent had answered the questionnaire. When the 
second reminder e-mail was sent out, 76 percent already had answered the survey. Until the 
deadline for answer the questionnaire another four percentage points of answers had been 
received, which gives an overall response rate of 80 percent, since 82 franchisees of the total 
population of 103 had answered the web-based questionnaire.   
  
The fact that it was possible to send the questionnaire to the entire study’s population, 
together with a response rate of 80 percent, indicate that the result has a high level of 
representativeness (Denscombe, 2009). Thereby a broad and comprehensive coverage of the 
study is achieved, which gives credibility to generalize parts of the survey’s result. 
 
Of the respondents, 82 percent answered either "yes" or "do not know" to the question "Do 
you perceive yourself as an entrepreneur who would be able to perform an expanded franchise 
concept with additional products/services?” Thus, 18 percent (15 people) answered "no" to 









4.2.5 Non-response analysis 
 
The 21 respondents who did not answer the questionnaire represent the study's external non-
response, which constitute 20 percent (Patel and Davidson, 2003). When the first e-mail with 
the questionnaire was sent, a number of auto e-mails was sent back with notifications that the 
person concerned was on vacation. Nine of the 21 franchisees, that did not reply the 
questionnaire, can be deduced to the fact that they were not at work during the week when the 
web-based questionnaire was available. It is hard to know exactly what the remaining external 
non-response at twelve answers (twelve percent of the population) could be due to, but a 
hypothetical reason may be that even some of these persons were on vacation, without 
sending an auto responder. There is also a risk that some answers have failed to materialize as 
a result of an active choice not to participate in the study. The assessment is, however, that the 
risk of a distorted result highly is limited, since the external non-response is so little when the 
people who were on holiday are excluded.  
 
Internal non-response occurs when information is missed from some respondents on some 
individual questions (Holme and Solvang, 1997). The risk that there would be a substantial 
internal non-response was limited when the structure of the questionnaire was made since all 
questions, except three (the open questions), are mandatory. Thereby the internal non-
response is small in this study. On the questions that are not mandatory there are not added a 
significant weight, since they are more of a complementary nature there the respondents are 
able to express more about the issues in the questionnaire. The risk of making most questions 
mandatory is that the respondents might feel insecure about what to answer. This risk was 
accomplished largely because all questions were possible to answer "do not know".   
 
The structure of the questionnaire was that those respondents who answered "no" on the last 
question in section three were directly referred to section five. Thereby it is a "selected" 
internal non-response on the entire section four of 18 percent. It is therefore essential to take 
into account that these responses do not reflect the entire population. Instead it reflects how 
the people who are willing to engage in an expanded franchise concept look at it.  
 
4.3 Background variables 
 
The population of the study, which in this case is the same as those who got the questionnaire, 
consists of 103 franchisees. These franchisees consist to 94 percent of men and to six percent 
of women. These men and women are franchisees in twelve different regional companies, 
from Skåne in the south of Sweden to Västerbotten in northern Sweden. It is most franchisees 
in Länsförsäkringar Göteborg och Bohuslän and in Länsförsäkringar Stockholm, which have 
23 franchisees each. Even Länsförsäkringar Östergötland and Länsförsäkringar Bergslagen 
have many franchisees, since they have 14 respective twelve franchisees. In the regional 
companies in Jönköping, Stockholm, Älvsborgs, Värmland and Dalarna there are nine, seven, 
six, four respective two franchisees. Finally, the regional companies in Halland, Uppsala and 
Västerbotten have one franchisee each. 
 
The distribution between women and men was just the same between those who responded to 
the questionnaire and the distribution in the population as a whole, which providing a good 
basis that is not distorted. Similarly, it is positive that all twelve regional companies are 
represented among the received answers. The external non-response is much larger in 
Länsförsäkringar Bergslagen compared to the other regional companies. Länsförsäkringar 
Bergslagen has a total of twelve franchisees and five of these have not answered the 




questionnaire and has not either sent an auto responder that tells that they are on holiday. 
Thus Länsförsäkringar Bergslagen stands for 42 percent of the external non-response. There 
is some risk that this distribution between the regional companies can distort the results 
somewhat, while the reason for this loss is unclear. Otherwise the non-response is relatively 
evenly distributed between the regional companies.  
 
Half of the franchisees have studied at university or college. The majority of the respondents 
(67 percent) is between 40 and 60 years old and has worked as franchisees to 
Länsförsäkringar in a maximum of ten years. Before the respondents were franchisees, 83 
percent of them were employed by Länsförsäkringar as sellers/advisors of insurance. The 
largest proportion of these franchisees was employed as sellers/advisors at Länsförsäkringar 
for at least eight years. 
 
The distribution is relatively even distributed between which insurance the respondents sell. 
More than a third sells both property- and life insurance, while the rest proportions are 
distributed between less than one third on sales of only property insurance and less than one 
third on only life insurance. This sale among the respondents occurs to 79 percent in the 
corporate market, to five percent in the private market, to one percent on the agricultural 
market and to 15 percent on more than one of these markets. 
   
The difference is large between how the franchisees operate their businesses. The most 
common is that the franchisee operates his/her business without a companion, which 
corresponds to 26 percent of the cases. After that 23 percent of the respondents operate their 
franchise companies with five or more partners and 17 percent operate it with one other 
partner. It is most common that the business employs five or more employees, which is the 
case for 30 percent of the respondents. Next, it is most common that the franchisees do not 
have any employees.     
 
4.4 Statistical hypothesis testing 
 
The hypotheses of the study are tested by Statistical hypothesis testing, which provides an 
indication of whether a relation between two variables rather depends on a coincidence than a 
real connection (Denscombe, 2009). The Statistical hypothesis testing shows whether there is 
a statistically significant relationship between the variables, which in such cases can be 
considered reliable. Two hypotheses are set up to examine the reliability of the variables 
relationship: 
 
- The null hypothesis (H0) assumes that there is not a relationship or dependence 
between the variables  
- The alternative Hypothesis (H1) assumes that it existences a relationship or 
dependence between the variables  
Through Statistical hypothesis testing a significance level is counted out. From a starting 
point with a choice of 0.05 as the highest allowed significance level the null hypothesis (H0) 
is assumed if the significance level gets a value that is higher than this (Bryman, 2011). If the 
value gets higher than 0.05, there is not a statistically significant relationship between the 
variables. A result between 0.000 and 0.050 shows instead that the probability that the result 
was just a coincidence is low. Thereby the null hypothesis is rejected, while the alternative 
hypothesis (H1) is assumed and the relationship between the variables is statistically 
significant.    




4.4.1 Chi-square test 
 
In this study, the Chi-square test is used as a method to find out if there is a significant 
relationship between the two variables (Denscombe, 2009). The Chi-square test examines the 
data’s homogeneity and is based on the fact that if all units are distributed evenly in a 
correlation table’s cells, there is no relationship between the variables. The null hypothesis 
constitutes the assumption that the two variables do not affect each other. This assumption is 
the expected value, which is the value that would be obtained if it was just coincidence that 
affected (Bryman, 2011). The Chi-square test uses the deviation in the correlation table’s cells 
that are between what was expected and what was observed in practice, to calculate whether 
the observed relationship was due to coincidence or not.  
 
Chi-square test is the most common Statistical hypothesis testing, perhaps much because it is 
flexible (Bryman, 2011). This test can namely be used at various levels of the structure of the 
questionnaire. However the Chi-square test has limitations since it requires a large sufficient 
data that must be sufficiently well distributed among the various categories. If any of the 
correlation tables’ cells contains less than five observations there is a risk of lack of precision 
in the statistics. To circumvent this problem, the categories can be combined, which in turn 
affects the statistics when these "boundaries" is created by the researcher. In this study, the 
data is medium sized. Since many of the questions have six different possible answers, the 
data sometimes are not sufficiently well distributed between the categories and thereby the 
categories sometimes have to be combined.   
 
4.4.2 Correlation analysis and Test of concordance 
 
While the Chi-square test illustrates the homogeneity of the data and whether there is a 
significant relationship between the variables the correlation looks to the intensity of the 
relationship, that is, how closely linked the two variables are (Denscombe, 2009). The 
Kendall's tau-b is one type of correlation analysis, which is used in this study. When there is a 
strong correlation Kendall's tau-b assumes values that are either close to 1 (complete positive 
correlation) or close to -1 (complete negative correlation). When no correlation exists at all 
the correlation coefficient assumes the value 0. When the correlation coefficient takes a 
positive or negative value of 0.7 it is seen as a relatively strong correlation, while a positive or 
negative value of 0.3 represents a relatively weak correlation. 
  
Although a Chi-square test only has seen that there is a hint of a relationship between two 
variables, a Test of concordance can show that there for example is a shift of the data in the 
cells (Denscombe, 2009). The Test of Concordance performs estimates that are based on 
concordant and discordant couples. If there is no statistical relationship between the two 
variables, concordant and discordant suppose equal values. The significance of this 
relationship can be tested by measurement of the p-value for the Test of concordance.  




5 Results and analyses  
 
The seven hypotheses can be derived under three theoretical fields which in this chapter are 
the sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. All these section starts with a presentation of the basic result, 
follows by the results of the questions in the questionnaire (see Appendix 4) that are linked to 
the hypothesis and the result of the statistical hypothesis testing. Each section ends with an 
analysis. Chapter 5 ends, through section 5.4, with a summary of the result.   
 
5.1 Environmental uncertainty and vertical integration  
 
5.1.1 Basic result 
 
The result of the study shows that 79 percent of the respondents in general enjoy being 
franchisees to Länsförsäkringar and thus be sellers/advisors of insurance. Likewise 92 percent 
of the respondents does either "strongly agree" or "agree rather well" with the statement that 
they generally enjoy their work. Based on the situation today, 62 percent of the respondents 
would like to be franchisees even five years after today. Of the respondents, it is 20 percent 
who do not know if they would like to be franchisees even five years after today, while 19 
percent responds that they do not want.   
 
Furthermore, the result does not show that the respondents perceive any appreciable 
uncertainty about whether they think that Länsförsäkringar is satisfied with their performance. 
Of the respondents 86 percent believes that Länsförsäkringar is so pleased that they want 
them left as franchisees even in five years after today. 
 
5.1.2 The result of Hypothesis 1a 
 
The less Länsförsäkringar is dependent on a continued cooperation today, the more the 
franchisees want to become integrated and expand the franchise concept.  
 
This hypothesis is based on two questions in the questionnaire. The first question was whether 
the franchisees experience that Länsförsäkringar is dependent to continue the cooperation with 
them today because the franchisees are knowledgeable about insurance. Question number two 
was whether the franchisees believe that an expanded franchise concept would increase the 
attractiveness for them to continue to be franchisees. 
 
The result for the first question in Hypothesis 1a shows that the majority of the respondents (42 
percent respectively 35 percent) agree completely or partly with the statement "I believe that 
Länsförsäkringar is dependent on a continued cooperation with me because I have knowledge 
of insurance." On this issue, it is only ten percent that "do not agree particularly well" or 
"disagree". The outcome of the second question in Hypothesis 1a shows that 31 respective 24 
percent "totally agree" respective "agree rather well" with the statement that an expanded 
franchise concept would make it even more attractive for them as franchisees to continue the 
cooperation. Furthermore, 16 percent of the respondents are indifferent, while 13 respective 
nine percent "do not agree particularly" respective "disagree" with the statement. 
 
Statistical hypothesis testing 
According to the Chi-square test the p-value is 0.54, which means that there is not statistically 
significant that there is a relationship between the variables in Hypothesis 1a. The correlation 
in the Kendall's tau-b amounts to 0.14, which only indicate a weak correlation. The Test of 




Concordance shows that the values between concordant and discordant are relatively well 
distributed (453 and 300), and thus there is only a weak relation between these two variables. 
The p-value in test of concordance amounts to 0.11, which means that the little relationship 
that was stated in the test of Concordance is not statistically significant. In summary, it is 
statistically proven that there is no relationship between the variables in Hypothesis 1a, thus 
the H0 is assumed. In other words, it is statistically proven that there is not a connection 
between that the franchisees who perceive that Länsförsäkringar is less dependent on future 
cooperation is more interested in a deeper integration and thereby to expand the franchise 
concept.  
 
5.1.3 The result of Hypothesis 1b 
 
The more an expanded franchise concept increases Länsförsäkringar’s will for a continued 
cooperation, the more the franchisees want to become integrated and expand the franchise 
concept. 
  
The hypothesis is tested based on whether the franchisees believe that an expanded franchise 
concept would make it more attractive for Länsförsäkringar to continue the cooperation, as 
well as whether the franchisees believe that an expanded franchise concept would increase the 
attractiveness for them to continue the cooperation. 
 
The result of the first question in hypothesis 1b shows that 55 percent of the respondents 
believe that an expanded franchise concept would make it more attractive for 
Länsförsäkringar to continue the cooperation. Although the majority agrees with this 
statement, a significant proportion of the respondents (19 percent) are indifferent and a 
smaller percentage (16 percent) disagrees with the statement. The result of the second 
question is presented above (see 5.1.2).  
 
Statistical hypothesis testing 
According to the Chi-square test, the p-value for the relationship between the questions in 
Hypothesis 1b is 0.00 and thus it is statistically significant that there is a relation between the 
two variables. The correlation in the Kendall's tau-b amounts to 0.86, which means that there 
also is a strong correlation between the variables. Moreover, the Test of concordance shows 
that there is a strong relationship (958 is concordant and 18 is discordant) between the 
variables and the p-value for this test is 0.00. Thus, the connection that the Test of 
concordance showed is statistically significant. The statistical hypothesis testing summarily 
shows that there is a very strong correlation between the variables in Hypothesis 1b and thus 
the H0 is rejected. In other words, the franchisees possible positive attitude to an expanded 
franchise concept depends on whether they think the expanded franchise concept would make 




The statistical hypothesis testing shows that there is no relationship between the variables in 
Hypothesis 1a. Therefore the franchisees do not seem to experience uncertainty today about 
the future since as many as 77 percent of the respondents agree with the statement that they 
think that Länsförsäkringar is dependent on a continued cooperation with them. This result 
shows therefore that the franchisees perceive their knowledge of insurance as crucial for 
Länsförsäkringar for a continued cooperation, which means that the franchisees are not easily 
interchangeable with other potential partners for Länsförsäkringar. Hypothetically, the 




franchisees are able to experience a competitive situation towards Länsförsäkringar’s 
employees in insurance, but according to the result described below (see 5.3.3) a competitive 
situation to a greater extent is not the fact. 
 
The result of the statistical hypothesis testing for Hypothesis 1b shows that there is a strong 
relationship between the variables. Although the franchisees do not perceive a considerable 
uncertainty about the future, the fact that an expanded franchise concept would increase 
Länsförsäkringar’s will to continue the cooperation is valued as highly essential. The 
franchisees are thus experience that the uncertainty for the future would be limited even more 
if an expanded franchise concept would increase Länsförsäkringar's desire for a continued 
cooperation. Since an expanded franchise concept would led to that the franchisees become 
more integrated with Länsförsäkringar, the franchisees could perceive the expanded concept 
as confidently, even though it also implies a greater dependence for them to a continued 
cooperation. 
 
The largest proportion of the franchisees (79 percent) is satisfied to be franchisees to 
Länsförsäkringar and 92 percent of the franchisees also like their work. Similarly 86 percent 
of the respondents experiencing that Länsförsäkringar wants to keep them as franchisees in 
the future for more than five years from now. Based on this result, there is reason to analyze 
how the future work could be developed so it gains both parties in the long run. However, 
there are percentages of the franchisees that are not so positive to a continued cooperation 
based on the situation today. The franchisees' experience seems not to be that they perceive 
any uncertainty about the duration of a continued cooperation. Instead, an assessment could 
be that some of the franchisees perceive uncertainty about how the cooperation will be 
developed and whether this development will contribute to an even better cooperation. 
 
The majority of the franchisees is positive to an expanded franchise concept and sees thereby 
it as a positive potential development of the cooperation. The part that perceives the greatest 
uncertainty for the survival of the cooperation would be more inclined to be more integrated, 
and thus expanded the franchise concept. In this case, none of the parties seems to perceive a 
significant uncertainty about the duration of a future cooperation and thus it is not a particular 
party that is more likely to become more integrated.  
 
 
5.2 Uncertainty and investments in transaction specific assets 
 
5.2.1 Basic result 
 
The result of the study shows that 73 percent of the respondents believe that there is 
interdependence for a future cooperation between them and Länsförsäkringar today. On this 
issue, it is only eight percent who "do not agree particularly well" or "disagree" with this 
statement. 
 
As previously said, 55 percent of the respondents agree with the statement that an expanded 
franchise concept would make it even more attractive for them to continue the cooperation. 
Furthermore, the result shows that 67 percent of the respondents believe that Länsförsäkringar 
successfully could carry out an expanded franchise concept, while 23 percent answered "do 
not know" on this question. Thus, it was only ten percent who answered "no". In turn, it was 
79 percent of the respondents who perceive themselves as entrepreneurs who could conduct 




an expanded franchise concept. On that point, 16 percent answered "no" and the remaining 
five percent "do not know". 
 
Among the respondents who perceive themselves as entrepreneurs that could be able to 
conduct an expanded franchise concept "Home inspection" is placed as the service that most 
ranks highest (see Figure 5). Subsequently, many respondents rated the service "Security 
(locks, alarms, surveillance)" high, followed by the "Legal office" and "Funeral director". 
Legal office is, however, also one of the services that many respondents ranks somewhere in 
the middle. Similarly the respondents have different opinions regard the attractiveness of the 


















The service that the respondents at least would like to see the franchise concept extended to is 
the "Mobile slaughterhouse" (See Figure 5). Subsequently "Pest Control" and "HR services" 
are less attractive services. "HR services" are also among the services that many respondents 
rank somewhere in the middle, together with the "Book-keeping agency" and "Business 
transfer agents". 
 
When the respondents themselves had the opportunity to give their own proposals on services 
that the franchise concept could be expanded with, 25 percent had any proposal at all which 
resulted in nine different proposals of services. Seven of the respondents suggest "Banking" 
and four respondents suggest "Private property insurance". Among the seven other proposals 
individual respondents indicated were for example "Fund advisory", "Claim settlement", 
"Sales of industrial properties", "Car repair shop" and "Training and health studio". 
 
5.2.1 The result of Hypothesis 2a 
 
The more transaction-specific the franchisees perceive that their knowledge of insurance is, 
the more attractive an expanded franchise concept is for them. 
 
The hypothesis is tested partly on whether the franchisees perceive that the knowledge they 
have built up around insurance is associated with a partnership with just Länsförsäkringar, and 
partly on whether the franchisees believe that an expanded franchise concept would increase 
the attractiveness for them to continue the cooperation.  
 
Figure 5: The degree to which respective service would be attractive to expand the franchise concept with, 
according to the franchisees 
 




Among the respondents, there are quite spread opinions about whether they perceive that the 
knowledge they have built up largely is associated with a partnership with just 
Länsförsäkringar. There are 27 percent who "agree rather well" with this statement, followed 
by 26 percent who answered "neither or". In the next step 20 percent agree completely with 
the statement, while 17 respective 10 percent answered "do not agree particularly" respective 
"disagree ". The result of the second question in the hypothesis is presented above (see 5.1.2). 
 
Statistical hypothesis testing  
According to the Chi-square testing it is not statistically significant that there is a relationship 
between the two variables in the Hypothesis 2a since the p-value is 0.31. The Kendall's tau-b 
assumes a value of 0.16, which indicates that there only is a relatively weak correlation 
between the two variables. The Test of concordance shows there is certain, but weak 
correlation between the variables because concordant arises to 525 and discordant to 337. The 
p-value for the Test of concordance shows that the weak link that appeared in the test is not 
statistically significant since the p-value is 0.07. Thus, it is statistically significant that there is 
no relationship between the two variables in Hypothesis 2a, which lead to that the H0 is 
assumed. In other words, there is no relation between that the franchisees would experience it 
as more attractive to expand the concept if they perceive that their knowledge of insurance is 
transaction-specific. 
 
5.2.3 The result of Hypothesis 2b 
 
The more an expanded franchise concept leads to interdependence, the more attractive an 
expanded franchise concept is for the franchisees. 
 
This hypothesis is answered by the relationship between the questions whether the franchisees 
and Länsförsäkringar would build interdependence for continued cooperation when the 
franchise concept gets expanded and whether the franchisees believe that an expanded 
franchise concept would increase the attractiveness for them to continue the cooperation. 
On the first question answered the 21 percent respective 34 percent that they "totally agree" 
respective "agrees rather well" with the statement. A relatively large proportion (22 percent) 
is indifferent to what they thought about the statement, while only 16 percent "do not agree 
particularly well" or "disagree" with the statement. The result of question number two is 
presented above (see 5.1.2).  
 
Statistical hypothesis testing 
The p-value amounts to 0.00 in the Chi-square test, which shows that it is statistically 
significant that there is a relationship between the variables in the Hypothesis 2b. The 
correlation between the variables amounts to 0.78 in the Kendall's tau-b and is thus relatively 
strong. The numbers of concordant and discordant are amount to 891 respective 35 in the Test 
of concordance and thereby it is a strong correlation between the variables. The p-value of the 
Test of concordance amounts to 0.00 and thus the relation that was illustrated in the Test of 
concordance is statistically significant. The conclusion of the Hypothesis 2b is that it is 
statistically proven that there is a very strong relationship between the two variables, which 
means that the H0 is rejected. Hence there is a strong link between that the franchisees would 
experience it as more attractive to expand the franchise concept if they perceive that 
interdependence would be built up when the franchise concept gets expanded. 
 
 






Among the respondents, there are different views on whether the knowledge they have built 
up within insurance is transaction-specific, and thus whether they consider themselves to be 
dependent on a continued interaction with Länsförsäkringar. The fact that 73 percent of the 
respondents perceive that there are interdependence to a future cooperation suggests that the 
franchisees do not perceive any appreciable uncertainty about a future cooperation. 
 
The result of Hypothesis 2a shows that there is not a connection between that the franchisees 
would experience it as more attractive to expand the franchise concept if they perceive that 
their knowledge of insurance is transaction-specific. Thus the franchisees, who are positive to 
an expanded franchise concept, do not primarily perceive that an expanded franchise concept 
would reduce the uncertainty. Instead, it seems that the franchisees feel relatively secure and 
confident in their interaction with Länsförsäkringar today. 
 
According to Hypothesis 2b, there is a connection between that the franchisees are experience 
it as more attractive to expand the franchise concept if they believe it would contribute to an 
even deeper interdependence. Theoretically, an expanded franchise concept could contribute 
to that both Länsförsäkringar and the franchisees will invest in additional knowledge. Today, 
both parties have developed knowledge of insurance and Länsförsäkringar has considerable 
knowledge in the subject since Länsförsäkringar also has own employees selling insurance. It 
is likely that a franchise concept, expanded with a service that today is not carried by 
Länsförsäkringar themselves, would lead to that Länsförsäkringar creates a greater 
dependence on future cooperation with the franchisees. Today the franchisees are more easily 
interchangeable with other dealers’/advisors’ knowledge of insurance. A franchisee that has 
both knowledge of insurance and an additional area becomes thus even more valuable for 
Länsförsäkringar and a deeper interdependence is created with less uncertainty compared with 
today. 
 
The degree to which an expanded franchise concept would contribute to a creation of 
interdependence is thus related to the type of service that the franchise concept would be 
expanded with. The closer the service is linked to one of Länsförsäkringar's core activities, the 
more knowledge Länsförsäkringar possesses within the area. "Home inspection" occurred as 
the service that the respondents ranked highest according to the study’s results. This service is 
performed within Länsförsäkringar today in varying degrees in different regional companies. 
Within Länsförsäkringar Stockholm a smaller amount of the home inspections is performed 
in-house. However Länsförsäkringar already today has knowledge in this area. Thus it is 
likely that the franchisees would have a greater dependence and more uncertainty to 
Länsförsäkringar Stockholm than vice aware because the franchisees’ investments in 
transaction-specific assets are more transaction-specific than Länsförsäkringar Stockholm’s. 
Since the franchisees do not have any knowledge of home inspections they would have to 
invest in that knowledge. This investment is thus highly dependent on a future cooperation 
with precisely Länsförsäkringar. 
 
If the franchise concept instead would been expanded with a service that none of the parties 
today have a deeper knowledge about, which includes all the proposed services except Home 
inspection and to some extent even Security (locks, alarm, surveillance), a higher degree of 
interdependence is created. 
 




According to the theory, interdependence can be achieved in two different ways. The first 
way is when both parties need to make transaction-specific investments to perform the 
cooperation when the franchise concept has been expanded. In the long term interdependence 
also can  be achieved when the franchisor (Länsförsäkringar) perceives that an expended 
franchise concept leads to that the franchisees must make transaction-specific investments and 
through this way the franchisees become more dependent to a future cooperation.  
 
In the second situation the franchisees, at the beginning, perceive an increased uncertainty, 
since they have to invest knowledge in to one more specific area that Länsförsäkringar 
demands. The uncertainty for the franchisees exists since there is little chance that another 
partner demands the same combination of knowledge. In this situation the problem for the 
franchisees with an expanded franchise concept is not related to that the franchisees get 
bounded to a specific transaction. Instead the franchisees’ investments in a combination of 
knowledge make them bounded. In the long term, Länsförsäkringar would perceive a less 
uncertainty about the future since it, due to an expanded franchise concept, feels that the 
franchisees are dependent to a continued cooperation. This lesser uncertainty will results in 
that Länsförsäkringar is willing to reduce the formal control and thereby delegating more 
decision-making to the franchisees, which results in lower transaction costs. When the degree 
of the influence becomes more widespread between the parties a greater interdependence can 
be created between them.  
 
5.3 Uncertainty due to human factors and agency costs 
 
5.3.1 Basic result 
 
As previously stated 79 percent of the respondents enjoy being franchisees to 
Länsförsäkringar. The result shows that 53 percent of the franchisees today perceive that there 
is interdependence to a future cooperation between the parties.  
 
5.3.2 The result of Hypothesis 3a 
 
The further the cooperation between Länsförsäkringar and the franchisees has lasted, the 
greater the adaptation between the parties’ interests has been. 
 
Of course it is various between different franchisees how long the collaboration with 
Länsförsäkringar has lasted. For some franchisees the cooperation began with an employment 
as seller/advisor of insurance that in next step went over to a franchise relation instead. Even 
how long the cooperation has lasted, in form of franchise, is various between different 
franchisees. Therefore, the answer of Hypothesis 3a is related to two different relationships. 
The first relationship is the connection between the two questions whether a larger adaptation 
has been made between the parties, when the cooperation with the franchise has lasted a long 
time. Connection number two for Hypothesis 3a is answered by the relationship between 
whether a larger adaptation has been made between the parties, when the partnership began 
with an employment at Länsförsäkringar for a longer time.  
 
The predominantly proportion of respondents (43 percent) agree with the statement "I 
perceive that my respective Länsförsäkringar’s interests are adapted more today than when 
the partnership began" because only 20 percent disagreed with this statement. Of the 
respondents, 33 percent answered "neither or" to this statement. Among the respondents, it is 
38 percent respective 40 percent that started as franchisees to Länsförsäkringar between the 




years 2005-2009 respective 2010-2015. Furthermore, 22 percent of the respondents have been 
franchisees to Länsförsäkringar during more than ten years. To the question if the franchisees 
have been employed salesmen/advisors at Länsförsäkringar before they became franchisees 
83 percent answered "yes". Among these franchisees, the majority has been employed for at 
least eight years.  
 
Statistical hypothesis testing 
At the Chi-square test of the relationship between the conforming interests between the 
parties and the number of years as a franchisee the p-value amounted to 0.11. This indicates 
that there is not a statistically significant relationship between the two variables. The 
correlation between the variables is relatively weak since it amounted to 0.23 in the Kendall's 
tau-b. The Test of concordance, however, shows that there is some correlation between these 
two variables since 983 are concordant and 497 are discordant, which expresses that there is a 
shift of data that the Chi-square test could not express. The relationship that the Test of 
concordance shows is statistically significant since the p-value amounted to 0.01. Thus it is 
statistically proven that there is a relationship between the variables and the H0 is rejected 
that saying that there is no relation. In other words this result shows there is a relationship 
between the corresponding interests and the number of years as a franchisee. According to the 
correlation value in the Kendall's Tau-b the correlation of this relationship is not so strong.  
 
Hypothesis 3a is also answered by testing the relationship between the conforming interests 
between the parties and the number of years of a possible previous cooperation with 
Länsförsäkringar has lasted, in the form of an employment as sellers/advisors of insurance. 
The Chi-square test shows a p-value of 0.35 and hence there is not a statistically significant 
relationship between the two variables. There is a very weak negative correlation of -0.13 
between the variables. The test of concordance shows certain, but weak, relation between the 
two variables since 513 are concordant and 771 are discordant. The p-value for the Test of 
concordance, however, shows that this weak relationship is not statistically significant 
because it amounted to 0.91. The conclusion is therefore that it is statistically proven that 
there is no relation between the two variables, and the H0 is assumed that says just that. In 
other words, there is not a relationship between the number of potential years as an employee 
seller/advisor at Länsförsäkringar and whether the franchisees perceive that their and 
Länsförsäkringar’s interests has been adapted over the time.  
 
5.3.3 The result of Hypothesis 3b 
 
The more satisfied the franchisees are of their economic situation, the greater the adaptation 
between Länsförsäkringar’s and the franchisees’ interests has been. 
 
This hypothesis is answered by the relationship between the two questions whether a larger 
adaption has been made between the parties when the franchisees are more satisfied over their 
financial situation. 
 
The result of the first question is presented above (see 5.3.1). In question number two 60 
percent agrees with the statement that they are satisfied over their financial situation as 
franchisees, since 43 respective 17 percent answered "agree rather well" or "totally agree". 
Among the respondents 22 percent are indifferent and 18 percent "do not agree particularly 
well" or "disagree" with the statement. 
 
 





Statistical hypothesis testing 
The p-value is 0.00 in the Chi-square test, which demonstrates that there is a strong 
statistically significant relationship between the variables in H3b. The Kendall's tau-b 
expresses that the correlation between the variables is weaker since it amounted to 0.46. The 
Test of concordance shows that there is a strong relation between the two variables since 1 
343 are concordant and 337 are discordant. In turn, the p-value for the Test of concordance 
amounts to a value that is broadly 0.00, which responds to that the relation that has been 
demonstrated is statistically significant. Thus it is statistically proven that there is a very 
strong relationship between the two variables, and the H0 is rejected thereby, even if the 
correlation says that the link is weaker. In other words, the statistical hypothesis testing gives 
basis to that the franchisees who perceive that an adaptation has been made between their and 
Länsförsäkringar's interests also are more satisfied over their financial situation as 
franchisees.  
 
5.3.4 The result of Hypothesis 3c 
 
The less intra-chain competition the franchisees perceive, the greater the adaptation between 
Länsförsäkringar’s and the franchisees’ interests has been.  
 
Hypothesis 3c concerns the relationship between the questions whether the franchisees are 
experience competition, both in relation to other franchisees and partly against 
Länsförsäkringar’s employees in insurance, and whether a larger adaptation has been made 
between Länsförsäkringar and the franchisees' interests. 
 
The result shows that 52 percent "disagree" with the statement "I experience a competitive 
situation between me and the other franchisees." It is only five percent who "strongly agree" 
with this statement. Otherwise, the distribution of the three answer options in the middle is 
relatively evenly distributed. In the statement "I experience a competitive situation between 
me and Länsförsäkringar’s employed sellers/ advisors" the answers are relative evenly 
distributed between the fixed options. The largest number of respondents (30 percent) 
answered "neither or", followed by 22 respective 21 percent that answered "do not agree 
particularly well" respective "totally agree". 
 
Statistical hypothesis testing 
In Hypothesis 3c the Chi-square testing shows a p-value of 0.26 for the relationship between 
the parties’ adaptation of interests and the competitive situation against other franchisees. 
Thereby it is not statistically significant that there is a relationship between the two variables. 
The correlation is virtually non-existent according to the Kendall's tau-b when it amounted to 
-0.01. Even the Test of concordance shows that there is no significant correlation between the 
variables since 705 are concordant and 736 are discordant. The minimal relation that the Test 
of concordance shows is rejected because the p-value amounts to 0.56. Thus it is statistically 
proven that there is no relationship between these variables and the H0 is assumed that says 
that there is no relationship. In other words, the Statistical hypothesis testing proves that there 
is not a relation between that when the franchisees feel a less competition to other franchisees; 
they perceive that a larger adaptation has been made between the parties. 
 
Hypothesis 3c is also answered by the relationship between whether franchisees who perceive 
less competition against Länsförsäkringar’s employees in insurance experience that a larger 
adaptation has been made between the parties. The Chi-square testing amounts to a p-value of 




0.06, which means that there is not statistically significant that there is a relationship between 
these two variables with a selected significance level of 0.05. According to the Kendall's tau-b 
the correlation is -0.06, which means that it is virtually non-existent. The Test of concordance 
shows that 802 are concordant and 934 are discordant. Since they adopt essentially the same 
value, there is no significant correlation between the variables. The p-value for this correlation 
is also high (0.73), which means the little link that appeared in the Test of concordance is not 
statistically significant. Thus it is statistically proven that there is no relationship between the 
two variables, and the H0 is assumed. In other words, there is not a connection between that 
when the franchisees feel less competition against Länsförsäkringar's employees within 




Depending on how the franchisor chooses to organize the cooperation with the franchisees 
has consequences for the autonomy the franchisees get. The result of the study shows that the 
majority of the franchisees believe that there is interdependence for continued cooperation 
between the parties today, which indicates that the parties’ interests are consistent to a great 
extent. Similarly the majority of the franchisees enjoy their work. This result suggests that the 
organization of the franchise cooperation is well done today. In order to increase the franchise 
chain’s efficiency and adaptability even more, Länsförsäkringar could consider if a higher 
degree of autonomy is an alternative. 
  
The downside, when the franchisees get extended autonomy, is that the principal (the 
franchisor) may get increased inspection costs because an extended needs to reduce the 
uncertainty by controlling the agents’ (franchisees’) actions. This behavior by the franchisee 
arises because of human factors and may be negative for the franchisor. The emergence of 
these inspection costs, however, can be tempered by certain character traits in the cooperation, 
which helps to reduce the integration of multiple goals between the franchisor and the 
franchisees. If these inspection costs can be reduced, it may be preferable to give the 
franchisee more autonomy. Meanwhile, the franchisor can protect the cooperation from 
potential conflicts through an indirect control, relational forms of governance. 
 
The Statistical hypothesis testing for the two relations between the questions in Hypothesis 3a 
proves that it is statistically significant that the interests between Länsförsäkringar and 
franchisees are better adapted in the partnerships when the franchisee has been a franchisee 
for a long time. In contrast to this relation, it is not statistically significant that a long 
collaboration between the parties, in the form of a former employment by Länsförsäkringar 
within insurance, has a positive impact on more consistent interests between the parties. 
Probably the difference between the two different relationships in Hypothesis 3a depends on 
that an earlier cooperation, in the form of employment, is not highly related to the cooperation 
that began when the franchise partnership began. Obviously this result, however, indicate that 
the relationship between the parties in the franchise partnership becomes increasingly mutual, 
the longer the cooperation lasts. Since the Statistical hypothesis testing shows that the 
franchisees perceive that their interests have been adapted more the longer the cooperation has 
lasted it is therefore scope for the franchisor to provide the franchisees a higher degree of 
autonomy, which, combined with relational forms of governance, results in only limited 
inspection costs.  
 
The statistical hypothesis testing for Hypothesis 3b provides strong statistical evidence that 
there is a positive relationship between when the franchisees are pleased with their economic 




situation, as a franchisee, a major adaptation has been made between the parties. Since this 
relationship exists, it is preferable for the entire franchise chain if the franchisor delegates 
more decision-making power to the franchisees. The franchisees’ increased autonomy do not 
contribute to generate substantial inspection costs for the franchisor, since there is only a little 
need of relational forms of governance when the interests already have been adapted.   
 
The result of the questions in Hypothesis 3c shows that the majority of the franchisees do not 
perceive a significant competition against other franchisees or Länsförsäkringar’s employees 
within insurance. The statistical hypothesis testing for Hypothesis 3c indicates that there is not 
a statistically significant relationship between that the franchisees whom perceive that their 
interests have been adapted over time also experience a less competitive situation. Since the 
majority of the franchisees are not experience a competition against each other or 
Länsförsäkringar's employees within insurance this has not a negative impact on the 
appearance of increased inspection costs. Thereby increased decision-making authority of the 
franchisees could be preferable even now.  
  
5.4 Summarized result 
 
In summary the result shows it is statistical significant that there is a relation between the 
variables in the hypotheses 1b, 2b and 3b (see Table 2). According to the statistical hypothesis 







H1a: Dependence, integration  No relation  
H1b: Willingness, integration  Relation 
H2a: Transaction-specific  No relation  
H2b: Interdependence  Relation  
H3a: Cooperation, adaptation  Relation, No relation  
H3b: Economic, adaptation  Relation  
H3c: Competition, adaptation  No relation, No relation  
 
According to this result (see Table 2) the franchisees want to become more integrated and 
expand the franchise concept the more the expanded franchise concept increases 
Länsförsäkringar’s willingness for a continued cooperation. An expanded franchise concept is 
more attractive the more an expanded franchise concept leads to interdependence. There has 
been a greater adaption between Länsförsäkringar and the franchisees the further the 
cooperation as franchisees has lasted. Finally it has been a greater adaption between 
Länsförsäkringar and the franchisees the more satisfied the franchisees are of their economic 
situation.   
     
 
 
Table 2: Summarized result of the statistical hypothesis testing  
 






6.1 Transaction Cost Theory 
 
An expanded franchise concept is a way for Länsförsäkringar and the franchisees to get more 
integrated with each other and thereby reduce the transaction costs. Today either 
Länsförsäkringar or the franchisees perceive a significant uncertainty regarding future 
cooperation since 73 percent of the franchisees believe that it already today is 
interdependence to a continued cooperation. Thus this result does not indicate that any 
specific party would be more interested to become more integrated with the other. Since 
today's relationship between the parties is not characterized by uncertainty the transaction 
costs would not greatly be reduced by a deeper integration through an expanded franchise 
concept. Thus lower transaction costs, due to reduced uncertainty, cannot be considered as the 
direct and strongest argument to expanding the franchise concept.  
 
The characteristics of the current situation between Länsförsäkringar and franchisees do not 
appear to be linked to information asymmetry to a larger extent since the parties perceive that 
an alignment of interests has taken place during the cooperation. Among the franchisees, there 
are quite dispersed views on whether the knowledge they have in insurance is transaction-
specific and hence is closely linked to the cooperation with Länsförsäkringar. Furthermore, 
there is no relationship between that the franchisees who perceive that their knowledge is 
transaction-specific also think that an extended franchise concept would make it more 
attractive for them to continue to be franchisees. The background for this result may be 
linked to the result that it is only few franchisees who feel uncertainty about a future 
cooperation. Consequently, either information asymmetry or transaction-specific investments 
are considered to be characteristics which today largely affect the transaction costs. Thereby 
this does not show a situation where a deeper integration directly will result in lower 
transaction costs in relation to fewer information asymmetry or lower uncertainty. 
 
The disadvantage of an extended franchise concept, and hence a deeper integration, is that 
bureaucracy costs increase as a result of, for example, increased administrative expenses or 
insensitivity to external changes. When Länsförsäkringar makes strategic decisions 
transaction costs should be placed in relation to the bureaucracy costs. If the franchise concept 
would be expanded with additional services it would be preferable if this service somehow is 
linked to the activities that the franchisees are engaged with today in insurance. In this way 
most synergies are possible to get and the administrative costs would be lower. If the service 
that the franchise concept gets expanded with would not be carried out by today's franchisees 
in insurance, and instead would be carried out by "new" franchisees, Länsförsäkringar would 
become more sensitive to external changes. A situation where the franchise concept is 
expanded, and thus consists of two different services, would make the franchisee less 
vulnerable to fluctuations in the outside world when he/she has multiple sources of income. In 
next step this flexibility of the franchisee creates a smaller uncertainty even for 
Länsförsäkringar. According to Mumdziev and Windsperger (2011), a situation that reduces 
the perceived environmental uncertainty for Länsförsäkringar in the long term results in that 
Länsförsäkringar chooses to devolve more decision-making power to the franchisees. 
 
Some of the franchisees feel, however, that the knowledge they have within insurance highly 
is associated with collaboration with specific Länsförsäkringar, which in itself contributes to 
uncertainty. Furthermore some franchisees feel uncertain about how the cooperation will be 




developed in the future. Through an expanded franchise concept the franchisees would build 
up a knowledge that is more specific and thus Länsförsäkringar’s dependency to a continued 
cooperation will increase. The situation where the franchisees feel a greater security for the 
future would in turn benefit Länsförsäkringar, who also would feel a greater sense of security, 
which creates interdependence. In this situation, either the franchisees or Länsförsäkringar is 
easily replaceable as partners for each other. When Länsförsäkringar perceives that security it 
would, according to the study of Mumdziev and Windsperger (2011), be willing to reduce the 
formal control over the franchisees, which in itself would contribute to reduced transaction 
costs when the inspection costs would be lower.  
 
The results of the study shows that there is a connection between that the franchisees are 
experience it as more attractive to expand the franchise concept if they believe it would 
contribute to a stronger interdependence. Thereby the franchisees would prefer to be more 
integrated with Länsförsäkringar, provide that it leads to a creation of an interdependence of 
future cooperation.  
 
Whether an expanded franchise concept would contribute to that even Länsförsäkringar 
becomes dependent of a continued cooperation is related to which service that the franchise 
concept would be expanded with. If the concept would be extended with a service that is 
closely related to Länsförsäkringar's ordinary activities, such as home inspection or possibly 
security (locks, alarms, surveillance), Länsförsäkringar would not create dependence that is as 
large as if the concept would be expanded with a service that is fully self-contained from 
today's activities.  
 
In the questionnaire that the franchisees answered nine proposals of services that the franchise 
concept could be extended with were listed. Thus the questionnaire was neutral, ensured that 
the franchisees themselves had to rank these services. The franchisees ranked home inspection 
as the service they considered as the most attractive, which means that this study supports the 
idea that home inspection could be a good option of service. Since the home inspection 
already is performed within Länsförsäkringar's organization in a large extent 
Länsförsäkringar's investment would not to a broader sense be considered as transaction-
specific compared to if the concept would be expanded with a service that is more self 
contained from today's activities. In this position, namely, Länsförsäkringar has options on 
how it could use the developed knowledge if it was not done in cooperation with the 
franchisees. Thereby Länsförsäkringar's investments would not be largely dependent on the 
cooperation with the franchisees.   
 
According to the study by Arranz and Arroyabe (2007), the form of governance would be 
more hierarchical (broken down by their optimal sizes) when the network is associated with 
transaction-specific investments, uncertainty and high frequency. Then, the network has the 
most to gain to submit the activities that are characterized by economies of scale and activities 
characterized by diseconomies of scale into separate organizations. The disadvantage of 
hierarchical decomposition is that the two types of activities are so closely linked that it is 
difficult to perform them completely separate. From this aspect, however, franchising is a 
good solution since the operations also are kept well integrated with each other, which is 
unlike a solution of outsourcing.   
 
In agreement with the study by Arranz and Arroyabe (2007) Länsförsäkringar's franchise 
chain can win to varying degrees depending on which service the franchise concept would be 
expanded with. A perform of home inspections in-house within Länsförsäkringar would be an 




activity that would be carried out to a relatively high frequency. This performance would not 
lead to that Länsförsäkringar Stockholm has to do extensive transaction-specific investments 
since much knowledge already is available in the organization. A perform of home 
inspections in-house would, however, cause a greater uncertainty for Länsförsäkringar since a 
new unit with additional staff and expertise would be needed. By a conduct of home 
inspection under a franchise concept the franchisees that already exist could be used, which 
are interested to become more integrated with Länsförsäkringar. It would be natural to 
develop the already successful franchise concept that is available with home inspection, 
which is closely linked to the insurance operations.  
 
6.2 Agency Theory 
 
The reasoning in the previous section suggests that an expanded franchise concept with home 
inspection would make the franchisees more bounded to a continued cooperation with 
Länsförsäkringar than vice versa. In a situation where the franchisees perceive a greater 
dependence to a continued cooperation than Länsförsäkringar it would be difficult for the 
franchisees to make counter claims. According to the study by Ehrman and Spranger (2005) 
the strongest growth in the long term, however, is created, in franchise chains where the 
parties cooperate and working to prevent this asymmetry, which for example can be done by 
adapting the contracts, organization and economy. 
 
Until today there has been a good adoption between the parties’ interests since the franchisees 
perceive that the interests have been adapted more the longer the cooperation has lasted. In 
order to create the maximum growth over the long term, it is advantageous if 
Länsförsäkringar works for to create a situation of interdependence, in which each party is 
dependent on the overall systems’ success. According to the study by Cochet et al. (2007) it is 
thus preferable to grant the franchisee a higher degree of franchisee autonomy. Through 
greater franchise autonomy the franchise chain’s efficiency and adaptability is promoted. 
 
The result of this study shows that this franchise chain has three characteristics that suppress 
Länsförsäkringar’s needs to add significant resources to control the franchisees, which are 
discussed in the study by Cochet et al. (2007). These three characteristics are age of 
relationship, economic success and the level of perceived intra-chain competition. The 
relationship of the franchise cooperation has namely become more mutual the further the 
cooperation has lasted. In the next step the study's results also shows that when the franchisee 
is satisfied with its economic situation a major adaption has been done between the parties’ 
interests. The result also shows that the majority of the franchisees do not feel any intra-chain 
competition. Nevertheless, there is not a connection between that the franchisees who feel that 
their interests have been adapted over time also experience a situation with lower competition. 
 
These character traits have thus dampened the impact of that the parties in the franchise chain 
initially consisted of an integration of multiple goals. In next step this considers that only 
limited control measures are required to reduce the increased uncertainty, and thus the 
inspection costs are limited. This control can be achieved through indirect control of the 
franchisees through relational forms of governance. The governance is performed through 
unwritten codes of conduct and through norms of behavior, rather than through direct control 
by, for example, explicit contract terms.  
 
Unlike the study by Cochet et al. (2007), this study shows that there has been a stronger 
alignment between the interests of the parties the longer the cooperation has lasted. In the 




study by Cochet et al. (2007), the age of the relationship is not a significant moderator 
variable. Cochet et al. (2007) found that this absence is a result of that only the number of 
years as franchisees have been studied, which thus do not include the possible years when the 
franchisee was an employee within the organization. In this study both the relationship 
towards the number of years as a franchisee and the relationship towards the number of years 
as an employee within Länsförsäkringar are examined. The result shows that there is a 
connection with the number of years as a franchisee but not with the number of years as 
employed. 
   
According to the study by Mumdziev and Windsperger (2011) the franchisor tend to 
increasingly delegate decision-making to the franchisee when the franchisor experience that it 
is difficult to monitor and measure the franchisee's behavior and performance. Depending on 
which service the franchise concept would be expanded with Länsförsäkringar feels, to 
different degrees, a sense of security to handle that the franchisee's handle in 
Länsförsäkringar's interest. Regard home inspection Länsförsäkringar probably would find it 
has large knowledge about home inspection within its organization and therefore 
Länsförsäkringar founds it as possible to monitor the franchisees’ execution in a good way. 
According Mumdziev and Windsperger (2011), this control would result in that 
Länsförsäkringar chooses to delegate less decision-making power to the franchisee than if the 
franchise concept was expanded with a service that is not closely linked to today's activities.  
 
Even López-Bayón and López-Fernández (2011) argue that increased franchisee autonomy 
can be positive since it contributes to that the franchise chain can utilize the franchisees’ local 
knowledge. In the relationship between Länsförsäkringar and the franchisees should not there 
be a significant emphasis on this aspect because Länsförsäkringar already, through its 
organization by the regional companies, largely has these advantages. If Länsförsäkringar 
grants the franchisees more autonomy, it is of high importance that this does not happen at the 
expense of a sharp deterioration of the franchise concept's homogeneity, which López-Bayón 
and López-Fernández (2011) highlight in their study. Instead, López-Bayón and López-
Fernández (2011) mean that decisions regarding assortment and local advertising increasingly 
should be delegated to the franchisees.  
 
The strategic decision to which extent the franchisor give the franchisees the opportunity to 
act independently could be compared with how the Länsförsäkringar Alliance today chooses 
to give each regional company autonomy. Länsförsäkringar Stockholm, and other regional 
companies, operates namely its own operations while the brand and the concept is the same, 
as it is in franchise chains. In both of these relationships, it is important to balance the weight 
of homogeneity with taking advantage of the local knowledge that the regional company or 
the franchisee has to create the greatest possible efficiency.   






The aim of this study was to provide theoretical explanations of Länsförsäkringar 
Stockholm’s opportunities to expand the franchise concept by including home insurance 
inspections. The relationship between the franchisor, Länsförsäkringar, and the franchisees is 
very positive today. By far most franchisees enjoy their work and their relation to 
Länsförsäkringar. The parties' interests have been adapted to each other during the 
cooperation. These characteristics of the cooperation form a good potential for a positive 
future cooperation.    
 
Based on the situation today the franchisees do not experience any significant uncertainty for 
the future. It is likely that the fact that the franchisees do not feel any significant uncertainty 
today results in that they do not primarily see an expanded franchise concept as an 
opportunity for deeper integration. However, there are trends in the results that suggest that 
the franchisees feel uncertain about how the cooperation will be developed and whether it will 
have a positive impact on the franchisees' situation. Probably this uncertainty is the reason to 
why the franchisees are extra positive to an expanded franchise concept if it would create 
interdependence between the parties.  
 
In particular the aim of this study was to examine whether the current franchisees in insurance 
are interested in broadening the franchise concept with additional products and services. Four-
fifths of the franchisees see themselves as entrepreneurs who are willing to perform an 
expanded franchise concept. For those franchisees home inspection considers to be the most 
attractive service, followed by security (locks, alarms, surveillance) and then legal office. 
Thereby it is a demand among today's franchisees to expand the current range with additional 
services, which very well could be home inspection.  
  
Even for Länsförsäkringar Stockholm, and probably several other regional companies, home 
inspection is an attractive service to expand the franchise concept with. Because the home 
inspection is closely linked to one of Länsförsäkringar's core businesses – insurance - a 
performing of home inspection under a franchise concept gives potential to provide major 
synergy effects for the entire operation within Länsförsäkringar Stockholm.  
 
Whether an expanded franchise concept would lead to a creation of interdependence between 
the parties is, however, linked to what type of service that the franchise concept gets 
expanded with. Since the home inspection today largely is performed in-house within 
Länsförsäkringar Stockholm, and within many other regional companies, there already exists 
an expertise within the field. Thereby Länsförsäkringar Stockholm would not have to make 
extensive transaction-specific investments to start up the home inspection activities. The 
franchisees however, would have to do extensive transaction-specific investments in order to 
continue the cooperation with Länsförsäkringar if the franchise concept gets expanded, which 
would make them more bounded to collaboration with specific Länsförsäkringar. 
  
In order to create the greatest possible long-term growth, for the regional companies and for 
the franchise chain overall, there are great advantages if Länsförsäkringar do not use this 
superior position of control fully. Instead Länsförsäkringar should work for to create 
interdependence for a future cooperation. Länsförsäkringar can create this interdependence by 
granting the franchisees a greater degree of autonomy, in exchange of an indirect control of 
the franchisees through relational forms of governance. The results of the study suggest that 
an expanded autonomy is beneficial since the factors age of the relationship, economic 




success and the level of perceived intra-chain competition have had a positive impact on this 
franchise chain which, as well as other franchise chains, initially consisted of an integration of 
multiple goals. The combination of franchise autonomy and relational forms of governance 
can contribute to that Länsförsäkringar receives a lesser need to control its agents, the 
franchisees. In next step these lesser need to control generates lower transaction costs in form 
of inspection costs. At the same time, the franchise chain’s efficiency and adaptability would 
be promoted if the performance of activities rather becomes adapted after where it is most 
effective that they are performed in the franchise chain, than after how the largest internal 
control gets achieved.  
 
Finally, both Länsförsäkringar and the franchisees have much to gain by expanding the 
franchise concept. Länsförsäkringar could get great synergies by applying the successful 
franchise concept to other areas. Although there is an interest to expand the franchise concept 
among the franchisees questions remains. One of these questions is whether there are 
entrepreneurial company managements within the regional companies that believe in an 
expanded franchise concept.  
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Appendix 1: Cover letter  
 
 
Hej bäste Franchisetagare, 
Enligt ett tidigare mail från Urban Johansson kommer här en länk till en undersökning som 
Du som franchisetagare till Länsförsäkringar har valts ut att medverka i. Dina svar i denna 
enkät, som tar ca 10 min att besvara, är viktiga för att mitt examensarbete ska bli komplett. 
Svaren, som är anonyma, kommer även att delges Länsförsäkringar och utgöra ett värdefullt 
bidrag till framtida utveckling av franchisekonceptet. 
 
Jag utför mitt examensarbete vid Institutionen för ekonomi, Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet i 
Uppsala, under handledning av professor Jerker Nilsson. Det färdiga examensarbetet kommer 
att publiceras i september 2015.  
  




Sista svarsdag är måndag den 29/6.  
  
Om Du har några frågor får Du gärna ta kontakt med någon av oss (se kontaktuppgifter 
nedan). 
 
Stort tack på förhand!  
  
Med vänliga hälsningar,  
 
Anna Berge  Urban Johansson  Jerker Nilsson
  
073-022 65 54 073-968 37 23  070-728 85 16 
anbe0020@stud.slu.se urban.johansson@lansforsakringar.se jerker.nilsson@slu.se 









På måndag kommer en student, Anna Berge, att skicka er ett mail med en länk till en 
enkätundersökning som tar cirka 10 minuter att besvara. 
 
Anna utför sitt examensarbete som handlar om franchising och det vore toppen om du tog dig 
tid att besvara enkäten då dina svar är viktiga för Anna men även utgör ett värdefullt bidrag 
till vårt framtida utvecklingsarbete då vi kommer att få ta del av era anonyma svar.   
  
Med vänlig hälsning 
 
Urban Johansson  
Länsförsäkringsbolagens Franchisesupport  
Tegeluddsvägen 21  
115 97 Stockholm  
08-562 837 23  








Appendix 3: Reminder e-mail  
 
 
Hej bäste Franchisetagare, 
 
Här kommer en påminnelse om att jag och Länsförsäkringar skulle vara väldigt tacksamma 
om Du har möjlighet att besvara frågeformuläret som är länkad nedan. Dina svar i denna 
enkät, som tar ca 10 min att besvara, är viktiga för att mitt examensarbete ska bli komplett. 
Svaren, som är anonyma, kommer även att delges Länsförsäkringar och utgöra ett värdefullt 
bidrag till framtida utveckling av franchisekonceptet. 
 
Jag utför mitt examensarbete vid Institutionen för ekonomi, Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet i 
Uppsala, under handledning av professor Jerker Nilsson. Det färdiga examensarbetet kommer 
att publiceras i september 2015.   
 




Sista svarsdag är måndag den 29/6.  
  
Om Du har några frågor får Du gärna ta kontakt med mig (Anna Berge), Urban eller min 
handledare (se kontaktuppgifter nedan). 
 
Stort tack på förhand!  
  
Med vänliga hälsningar,  
 
Anna Berge  Urban Johansson  Jerker Nilsson
  
073-022 65 54 073-968 37 23  070-728 85 16 
anbe0020@stud.slu.se urban.johansson@lansforsakringar.se jerker.nilsson@slu.se 




Appendix 4: The web-based questionnaire   
 
Länsförsäkringar 
Svar: 82/103=80%  
 
1. Bakgrundsfrågor 
Var god att ange ett svarsalternativ på följande frågor 
Besvarad av: 82 (100%) Ej besvarad av: 0 (0 %) 
 
Är Du kvinna eller man? 
1 
 
Kvinna 5 (6 %) 
2 
 





Besvarad av: 82 (100 %) Ej besvarad av: 0 (0 %) 
 
Hur gammal är Du? 
1 
 
Upp till 29 år 2 (2 %) 
2 
 
Mellan 30-39 år 13 (16 %) 
3 
 
Mellan 40-49 år 25 (30 %) 
4 
 
Mellan 50-59 år 30 (37 %) 
5 
 





Besvarad av: 82 (100 %) Ej besvarad av: 0 (0 %) 
 
Vilken är Din högsta utbildningsnivå? 
1 
 
Grundskola 2 (2 %) 
2 
 
Gymnasium 37 (45 %) 
3 
 





Besvarad av: 82 (100 %) Ej besvarad av: 0 (0 %) 
 
I vilket länsbolag är Du franchisetagare? 
1 
 
Länsförsäkringar Bergslagen 7 (9 %) 
2 
 
Länsförsäkringar Dalarna 1 (1 %) 
3 
 
Länsförsäkringar Göteborg och 
Bohuslän 18 (22 %) 
4 
 
Länsförsäkringar Halland 1 (1 %) 
5 
 
Länsförsäkringar Jönköping 9 (11 %) 
6 
 
Länsförsäkringar Skåne 3 (4 %) 
7 
 
Länsförsäkringar Stockholm 19 (23 %) 
8 
 
Länsförsäkringar Uppsala 1 (1 %) 
9 
 
Länsförsäkringar Värmland 4 (5 %) 
10 
 
Länsförsäkringar Västerbotten 1 (1 %) 
11 
 
Länsförsäkringar Älvsborg 6 (7 %) 
12 
 









Besvarad av: 82 (100 %) Ej besvarad av: 0 (0 %) 
 




År 1984-1989 0 (0 %) 
2 
 
År 1990-1994 3 (4 %) 
3 
 
År 1995-1999 6 (7 %) 
4 
 
År 2000-2004 9 (11 %) 
5 
 
År 2005-2009 33 (40 %) 
6 
 





Besvarad av: 82 (100 %) Ej besvarad av: 0 (0 %) 
 
Har Du varit anställd som säljare/rådgivare hos Länsförsäkringar innan Du blev franchisetagare? 
1 
 
Ja, under 1-3 år 4 (5 %) 
2 
 
Ja, under 4-7 år 21 (26 %) 
3 
 
Ja, under minst 8 år 43 (52 %) 
4 
 
Nej 14 (17 %) 
5 
 
Nej, men jag har haft en annan 





Besvarad av: 82 (100 %) Ej besvarad av: 0 (0 %) 
 
Vad säljer Du för försäkring? 
1 
 
Både liv- och sakförsäkring 32 (39 %) 
2 
 
Endast livförsäkring 24 (29 %) 
3 
 





Besvarad av: 82 (100 %) Ej besvarad av: 0 (0 %) 
 
På vilken marknad bedrivs Din försäkringsförmedling? 
1 
 
Endast på företagsmarknaden 65 (79 %) 
2 
 
Endast på lantbruksmarknaden 1 (1 %) 
3 
 
Endast på privatmarknaden 4 (5 %) 
4 
 





Besvarad av: 82 (100 %) Ej besvarad av: 0 (0 %) 
 
Är Du delägare med någon i detta franchisebolag? 
1 
 
Ja, 1 person 14 (17 %) 
2 
 
Ja, 2 personer 9 (11 %) 
3 
 
Ja, 3 personer 9 (11 %) 
4 
 
Ja, 4 personer 10 (12 %) 
5 
 
Ja, 5 personer eller fler 19 (23 %) 
6 
 









Besvarad av: 82 (100 %) Ej besvarad av: 0 (0 %) 
Har Du/Ni någon anställd i Din/Er verksamhet? 
1 
 
Ja, 1 person 9 (11 %) 
2 
 
Ja, 2 personer 15 (18 %) 
3 
 
Ja, 3 personer 13 (16 %) 
4 
 
Ja, 4 personer 1 (1 %) 
5 
 
Ja, 5 personer eller fler 25 (30 %) 
6 
 





2. Dagens situation 
Hur Du upplever Din situation som franchisetagare i dag 
 
Var vänlig ta ställning till följande påståenden om hur Du upplever din arbetssituation. Ju högre siffra Du 






















1 I allmänhet trivs jag med mitt arbete 0 (0 %) 2 (2%) 5 (6%) 24 
(30%) 50 (62 %) 0 (0%) 
81/82 
(99 %) 
2 Jag är nöjd över min ekonomiska situation som 






(43%) 14 (17 %) 0 (0%) 
81/82 
(99 %) 
3 I allmänhet trivs jag med att vara 




(43%) 29 (36 %) 0 (0%) 
81/82 
(99 %) 
4 Jag upplever att mina respektive 
Länsförsäkringars intressen stämmer överens 
mer i dag jämfört med när samarbetet inleddes 





(31%) 10 (12 %) 3 (4%) 
81/82 
(99 %) 
5 Jag upplever en konkurrenssituation mellan mig 






(12%) 4 (5 %) 0 (0%) 
81/82 
(99 %) 
6 Jag upplever en konkurrenssituation mellan mig 











Var vänlig ta ställning till följande påståenden som behandlar huruvida Du/Länsförsäkringar känner ett 






















1 Jag anser att de kunskaper som jag har byggt 
upp kring försäkring i hög grad är förknippade 
med ett samarbete med just Länsförsäkringar 





(27%) 16 (20 %) 0 (0%) 
81/82 
(99 %) 
2 Jag tror att Länsförsäkringar är beroende av ett 
fortsatt samarbete med mig eftersom jag har 
kunskaper om försäkring 
3 (4 %) 5 (6%) 11 
(14%) 
28 
(35%) 34 (42 %) 0 (0%) 
81/82 
(99 %) 
3 Jag anser att det finns ett ömsesidigt beroende 
till ett framtida samarbete mellan mig och 
Länsförsäkringar 
2 (2 %) 5 (6%) 15 
(19%) 
26 










Hur Du tänker angående framtiden 
Besvarad av: 81 (99 %) Ej besvarad av: 1 (1 %) 
 
Utifrån situationen som är i dag, skulle Du vilja vara franchisetagare även om 5 år? 
1 
 
Ja 50 (62 %) 
2 
 
Nej 15 (19 %) 
3 
 





Besvarad av: 81 (99 %) Ej besvarad av: 1 (1 %) 
 
Tror Du att Länsförsäkringar är så pass nöjda med Din prestation så att de vill ha Dig kvar som 
franchisetagare även om 5 år? 
1 
 
Ja 70 (86 %) 
2 
 
Nej 5 (6 %) 
3 
 





Besvarad av: 81 (99 %) Ej besvarad av: 1 (1 %) 
 
Länsförsäkringar bedriver i dag franchiseverksamhet inom försäkring och fastighetsförmedling. Tror Du att 




Ja 54 (67 %) 
2 
 
Nej 8 (10 %) 
3 
 





Besvarad av: 81 (99 %) Ej besvarad av: 1 (1 %) 
 




Ja 64 (79 %) 
2 
 
Nej 13 (16 %) 
3 
 





4. Framtiden: utökat franchisekoncept 
Avslutningsvis följer ett avsnitt om Dina inställningar till ett utökat franchisekoncept 
 
Om Länsförsäkringar skulle utöka sin franchiseverksamhet, vilken av dessa tjänster skulle Du helst se att 
det gjordes inom? Var vänlig rangordna följande alternativ, där siffran 1 betyder att det är det bästa 







































































(12%) 4 (6%) 3 (4%) 
67/82 
(82 %) 
4 Företagsförmedling 7 












(10%) 1 (1%) 
67/82 
(82 %) 









(19%) 6 (9 %) 2 (3%) 
67/82 
(82 %) 











%) 2 (3 %) 5 (7%) 
67/82 
(82 %) 
7 Mobilt slakteri 10 
(15%) 
10 




















(13%) 2 (3 %) 
67/82 
(82 %) 
9 Säkerhet (lås, larm, 
bevakning) 
16 














Besvarad av: 65 (79 %) Ej besvarad av: 17 (21 %) 
 
Har Du förslag på något annat specifikt område som franchisekonceptet skulle kunna utökas till? 
1 
 
Nej 49 (75 %) 
2 
 






Var vänlig ta ställning till följande påståenden med utgångspunkt från antagandet att Länsförsäkringar 
skulle utöka franchisekonceptet så att det innefattade en ytterligare del. Ju högre siffra Du väljer 




















1 Jag anser att ett utökat franchisekoncept skulle 
göra det ännu mer attraktivt för mig att fortsätta 
vara franchisetagare till Länsförsäkringar 





(24%) 21 (31 %) 4 (6%) 
67/82 
(82 %) 
2 Jag tror att ett utökat franchisekoncept skulle göra 
det ännu mer attraktivt för Länsförsäkringar att 
fortsätta samarbetet med mig som franchisetagare 





(25%) 20 (30 %) 5 (7%) 
67/82 
(82 %) 
3 Jag tror att jag och Länsförsäkringar skulle bygga 
upp ett ömsesidigt beroende till ett fortsatt 
samarbete om franchisekonceptet utökades 














5. Övriga kommentarer 
Här har Du möjlighet att komplettera de svar som Du har gett tidigare  
  
 
 
 
